When we analyze the driving forces of the political process in Ukraine, we must also consider external factors that influence Ukrainian politics.
The three international forces that have the most significant impact on domestic politics are the United States, Russia, and the European Union. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has also significantly impacted the Ukrainian state’s economic policy from time to time (especially in financial crises).
The influence of these external actors was very different (in form, content, and instruments). In the 1990s and early 2000s, the United States and Russia had more influence. This was mainly an influence on foreign policy. However, the United States also actively influenced the formation of civil society in Ukraine and the part of the new political class that was ideologically oriented toward democratic values. Russia had more influence through interpersonal and corporate ties in the administrative, political, and business environment.
There was no targeted political influence on Ukraine from Russia for quite a long time (during the presidency of Boris Yeltsin and at the beginning of Putin’s rule). But when Putin began “Eurasian integration,” this influence on Ukraine proliferated. During this period, our country faced the dilemma of choosing between “Eurasian” and European integration. But what was the difference in terms of their influence as driving forces?
Russia was pulling Ukraine into the net of Eurasian integration and began to form an informal coalition of supporters of economic and political integration with Russia in Ukraine. The Kremlin also actively blocked the process of Ukraine’s integration into NATO at the diplomatic level, which was especially evident in 2008 during the Bucharest NATO summit, when, under Russian influence, Ukraine and Georgia were denied NATO Membership Action Plans. The European Union, unlike Russia, was more likely to spread influence by setting a positive example. In 2004, nine Eastern European countries joined the EU, including Poland and the Baltic states, which had a powerful impact on strengthening pro-European sentiment in Ukraine. Ukrainians struggled to continue our country’s European integration, which became one of the main reasons for the Revolution of Dignity.
Even more decisive changes occurred after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The outbreak of a major war between Russia and Ukraine on February 24, 2022, marked the final break in post-Soviet ties between the two countries. Russia lost its domestic political instruments of influence on Ukrainian politics, but tried to regain control over Ukraine militarily. This attempt failed, although Russia temporarily occupied another part of Ukraine’s territory. Contrary to Russia’s intentions, the opposite trend has emerged – Ukraine’s integration into the Western world has accelerated significantly. Ukraine has been granted the status of an EU candidate. The West provides Ukraine with large-scale economic and military-technical assistance to counter the Russian invasion.
If the war between Ukraine and Russia drags on, Western countries will continue to support our country (because it is in their geopolitical interests), although the scale of this assistance may vary.
While Ukraine’s integration into the Western world has undoubtedly given the EU and the US a systemic influence on Ukrainian politics, it is also worth noting that in the course of the successful war with Russia, Ukraine has quickly acquired geopolitical subjectivity, which our country’s Western partners have to take into account. But Russia has finally lost its influence on Ukrainian politics. Instead, in the event of a military victory over Russia and the emergence of internal political crises in Russia, Ukraine may become a significant factor in influencing the internal Russian situation.
It is highly likely that even after the current war is over, relations between Russia and Ukraine will remain conflictual and even hostile. Russia has created large-scale and powerful anti-Russian sentiment in Ukraine through its war against Ukraine and its crimes against the Ukrainian people. The wounds and emotions of the war will not heal for at least one generation, possibly longer. There will almost certainly be no restoration of diplomatic relations, and it seems unlikely that meaningful economic ties between Russia and Ukraine will be restored. If Russia maintains its current political regime and hostile policy toward Ukraine, there is a high risk of a new Russian invasion of our country.
The risk of a new war between Russia and Ukraine may persist even if the current war is frozen. As a result of the war, Russia will ultimately lose the tools to influence the domestic political situation in Ukraine, so it will focus on external propaganda influence on our country (which will also be significantly limited), the possibility of military pressure, and diplomatic opposition to Ukraine.
The influence of the United States and the European Union on Ukrainian politics will continue after the war is over. Still, its level will depend on the degree of Ukraine’s integration into the EU and NATO. Ukraine’s accession to the European Union and the North Atlantic Alliance will ensure the collective West’s sustainable institutional influence on the Ukrainian political process, especially on the content and pace of structural reforms and anti-corruption policy, will ensure the irreversibility of the democratic and European choice of the Ukrainian people, and will dramatically reduce the risk of a new Russian invasion of Ukraine.
If the process of Ukraine’s integration into the EU and NATO is delayed, it will significantly reduce the level of institutional influence of the West on Ukrainian politics. This influence will then depend more on the scale of international assistance in restoring the Ukrainian economy, infrastructure, and social sphere. The main objects of influence will then be the economic and infrastructure policy of the Ukrainian state and the procedures for controlling the use of international assistance for the restoration of Ukraine. The countries with the most significant influence will be those that actively partner with Ukraine and become guarantors of its security. If Trump wins the U.S. presidential election, the impact of the United States on Ukrainian politics may become controversial and ambiguous and, in the long run, may even decrease to some extent. However, it is implausible that the United States will completely abandon its assistance to Ukraine and its influence on Ukrainian politics.
We see a trend of China’s growing influence in international politics on individual countries and regions worldwide. There may be attempts to increase China’s influence on Ukrainian politics, especially if the influence of the United States decreases. However, such influence will likely be insignificant. It will be significantly limited by the fact that China has active partnerships with Russia (and therefore, the advancement of China’s positions in Ukraine will be perceived with great caution and cause significant restrictions). It should also be noted that China does not have its own infrastructure to influence Ukrainian politics. If, after the war between Russia and Ukraine is over, the United States remains our country’s leading international partner (which is highly likely), this will block the possible growth of China’s influence in Ukraine.
Thus, the influence of external factors on Ukrainian politics in the postwar period will be determined by the conditions of the end of the war with Russia, as well as the further policy towards Ukraine of our international partners.
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