China

The launch of large-scale US and Israeli strikes against Iran starting on February 28 — framed by President Donald Trump’s objectives of degrading Tehran’s military capabilities and potentially precipitating regime change — places Beijing in a strategically uncomfortable position. This campaign is the most significant US military operation since the Iraq War, unfolding across a region central to China’s energy security and commercial ambitions. China formally opposes regime change and externally engineered political transitions as a matter of doctrine, viewing them as contrary to principles it treats as protective of both Iranian sovereignty and its own domestic and territorial sensitivities. That doctrinal stance shaped Beijing’s early response, as it joined Moscow in&nb

What looks like a setback for Beijing in West Asia might actually be more leverage - a chance to build long-term capital without firing a single shot. The present crisis in Iran - set in motion by the joint US-Israeli strikes of February 28 that killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and decapitated key nodes of Iran's leadership - marks yet another inflexion point in the churn of West Asian geopolitics. For China, this is undeniably a setback. But it is neither terminal nor transformative in the way some might prematurely suggest. Rather, it is a reminder of the structural limits of Beijing's ambitions in a region still profoundly shaped by American hard power. Beijing's reaction has been swift, if predictable. Denouncing the strikes as "unacceptable" and violative of internation...

Arguing that Chinese policy is hung on alliances—with imputations of obligation—misses the point.  In the wake of the coordinated U.S. and Israeli attacks on Iran and the U.S. seizure of Nicolás Maduro from Caracas, many in the American strategic class express surprise that Beijing does not ride to the rescue of its strategic partners. A former U.S. ambassador to China (and my former boss) Nicholas Burns puts this point especially bluntly: “China,” he concludes, “is proving to be a feckless friend for its authoritarian allies.” But China’s standoffish posture is not, in fact, a surprise. Simply put, avoiding binding security commitments to peripheral third countries is not a sign of weakness but is by strategic design. It is patently obvious that regimes such as Aya

Europe faces a dilemma in its engagement with China. While closer relations with Beijing could reduce European dependence on the US, it would also risk provoking a harsh response from Washington. Gesine Weber and Zeno Leoni argue that Europe can overcome this challenge if it embraces its role as a middle power. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz is making an official visit to China on 25–26 February. His trip follows similar visits by French President Emmanuel Macron in December and Canada’s Prime Minister Mark Carney and UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer in January. These visits come at a complex time for relations between China and Europe. China’s position on the Russia-Ukraine war and the impact of its trade practices

After the skirmish between India and Pakistan in May 2025, Pakistan became America’s new favorite ally — a strategic reset that came as a bolt out of the blue for many. With Pakistan basking in the glory of its military feat, a diplomatic spectacle unfolded, with US President Donald Trump and Pakistan Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif as costars, showering each other with effusive praise. From lauding Trump’s “peacemaker” role to floating a Nobel Peace Prize nomination and now jumping on the bandwagon of Trump’s adventurism — the “Board of Peace” — Pakistan has delivered masterful diplomacy, which, although glaringly obsequious, remains well reciprocated. A strategic windfall for Islamabad As Islamabad enjoys the perks of this upswing, the diplomatic fanf