Professor Stephen M. Walt of Harvard University recently wrote in Foreign approach that the United States should base its approach toward the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on the answers to five basic issues.
Walt’s primary concerns center on China’s economic future, the effect of U.S. efforts to limit China’s access to cutting-edge technologies, Xi Jinping’s leadership skills, the “effectiveness” of balancing against China by other countries, and the results of the competition between China and the U.S. to win over coalition allies.
I like Walt’s fundamental notion, however I may rephrase his essential questions somewhat. Therefore, I will provide my own (more concise) list.
Is there wiggle space for Beijing and Washington to agree on a delineation of regional influence and commitments? By “accept,” I mean that the risk of conflict has diminished to an acceptable level. The United States and China have divergent goals for the Asia-Pacific region, including competing desires for freedom of maneuver, special partnerships, and preferred methods for resolving certain strategic challenges.
Beijing and Washington could be able to agree to keep out of each other’s way and make the deal work if they treat it like the 1814–1914 Concert of Europe and recognize that their respective essential interests, those they would go to war for, are truly restricted enough.
On the other hand, it’s possible that the competing objectives of the United States and the People’s Republic of China are mutually exclusive, with too many topics over which neither nation is ready to negotiate or make concessions.
The Chinese government’s difficulty to accept the United States as the region’s preeminent strategic player and the United States’ government’s determination to maintain that status are only two such examples. Another scenario is if Beijing decides that fighting for Taiwan’s or the South China Sea’s control is preferable to putting up with what it sees as US obstruction.
Which option the United States administration pursues—a permanent détente with China or preparation for an anticipated war—depends on the outcome of this issue.
Is it possible that China will come to dominate the Indo-Pacific? This adds Walt’s concern about China’s economic future to a larger one. Assumptions that China would eventually overtake the United States as the world’s preeminent power have formed the basis for Xi’s aggressive foreign policy. China’s military might and international clout depend on the country’s sustained rapid economic development and its success in breaking out of the “middle-income trap.” But if China’s economy slows down after four decades of tremendous expansion, Beijing will have to lower its regional and global ambitions.
There are mounting signs that the PRC economy has plateaued. Issues such as local government debt, a collapsing property market, rising youth unemployment, and a decline in foreign investment have emerged in addition to the long-anticipated structural problems of a shrinking cohort of factory workers relative to retirees and an over-reliance on exports and building infrastructure for growth.
Author
