Tibet is the palm, which we must seize, stated Mao Zedong. Next, we’ll pursue the five fingers. After Nepal, Bhutan is the third “finger”.
With the recent remarks made by the prime minister of Bhutan, Lotay Tshering, to Belgian Daily La Libre, the territorial and boundary-related difficulties between Bhutan, China, and India were exacerbated. Since then, concerns have been voiced over whether Bhutan is changing its stance. This is particularly true in light of how Thimphu has approached Beijing over the matter. Evidently, Bhutan’s position has changed in light of Tshering’s assertion that China “holds a stake in finding a resolution” to the territorial issue.
China has recently made clear moves to assert new, rash claims in Bhutan’s eastern region. Arunachal Pradesh, an Indian state, is bordered by this region. China specifically claims three regions in Bhutan. These are Doklam in the west, bordering India, and Pasamlung and Jakarlung in the north, bordering Tibet.
Beijing started laying claim to Bhutan’s Sakteng Wildlife Sanctuary in June 2020. Beijing allegedly made the decision to label the refuge “disputed territory” in order to prepare for the possibility of future takeover.
Economic and physical geography
Bhutan is located to the west of Tawang, the smallest of Arunachal’s 26 administrative districts. The whole western side of Tawang would be cut off if Sakteng Sanctuary were taken over. India will suffer a serious military and strategic setback as a consequence. As a result, China will probably scrutinize any potential Indian maneuver. This explains why it suddenly announced fresh claims in the eastern region of Bhutan.
All neighbors should exercise vigilance in light of China’s approach of proclaiming new claims and claim-lines across its Himalayan frontiers. Included in this is the “newly-created version” of the Line of Actual Control (LAC), which runs across the eastern Ladakh sector between China and India. Bhutan now seems to be reconsidering talks with China on the border and territory dispute. All of this is related to how China has thought and behaved historically.
Notably, regionalism in Chinese geography during the 1950s focused on the physical and economic subfields of geography. In contrast, geography was predominantly studied as a systematic and regional subject in the West. Communist China prioritized physical geography and economic geography, seeing geography as a physical science. The Department of Economic Planning of People’s University (Beijing), which houses the Division of Economic Geography, is the bastion of the latter.
In this regard, China’s claims—including those on Japan’s Senkaku Islands—are motivated by economic geography. China “rediscovered” the Senkaku Islands in 1969 after oil and other hydrocarbons were found nearby. Future offshore oil production became the main motivation for Beijing’s claims to the Senkaku Islands in the guise of “territory.”
The Five Fingers of Mao
Mao Zedong’s alleged “Five Fingers” plan was a manifestation of the deadly confluence of geography and history. After annexing Tibet, Mao is credited as saying, “Tibet is the palm, which we must occupy. Next, we’ll pursue the five fingers. Ladakh is the first of these fingers, followed by Sikkim, Arunachal Pradesh, Nepal, Bhutan, and Bhutan.
The Chinese army has mobilized across the Five Fingers area and its component states in Doklam, Arunachal Pradesh, eastern Ladakh, Bhutan, and Nepal. This nearly completely encircles the Himalayan boundary and sends a troubling message. Additionally, it highlights how important geopolitics is to a revisionist state’s (China’s) policy decision and its implementation method.
It is obvious that the consequences of the boundary and territorial conflict in the Himalayan borders go well beyond the interests of the governments that are directly involved. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union’s First Secretary, Nikita Khrushchev, said in Bucharest on June 26, 1960, that the Chinese approach to the issue (with India) was a “tactical error.” He said that it was an obvious manifestation of “Chinese nationalism.” According to a declassified US CIA dossier on the Sino-Indian Border Conflict from 1959–1961 that was authorized for distribution in May 2007.
Numerous historical fictions have shaped our sense of national identity, which only serves to pique our attention. Additionally, it strengthens the nation’s political dictatorship. The aggressive foreign policy and state action of a revisionist power are thus determined by this “national interest”.
A Policy of Opportunism Short of War
“Ladakh and the Sino-Indian Border Crisis” was the title of a 1962 Asian Survey study by Margaret W. Fisher and Leo E. Rose. They said that China may have mostly been pursuing opportunistic measures meant to seize any advantage imaginable, short of going to war. Otherwise, it seemed at least as likely that they were methodically building the framework for a longer-term, more nefarious scheme.
The current incursions and strategy being developed by China for all the areas listed have this historical context. Its policies depict the current state of affairs in South Asia’s Himalayan frontiers.
The communist regime’s connections to China’s historical philosophy and contemporary political and military policy for this area are evident in the country’s activities. Numerous Chinese initiatives in Ladakh, Bhutan, Nepal, and Arunachal Pradesh seem to be intended to promote numerous goals at once. Beijing’s topographical considerations take into account how important access is to the various areas.
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