Regional and international parties have voiced concern about China’s growing security presence in Central Asia. As Beijing’s economic and political sway over Central Asia grows, so has its security footprint, which has repercussions for regional security dynamics, stability, and human rights. Analyzing the variables affecting China’s security participation in Central Asia, its security cooperation plans with regional allies, and the impacts of its growing influence on the region and beyond are critical in this context.
China is increasing its security presence in Central Asia. (Illustrative Image)
Chinese security presence in Central Asia is growing (An Illustration)
Central Asia is a region of strategic significance for China due to its enormous natural resources, necessary transportation links, and essential shared border for China’s security. Central Asia is considered to be a key region for China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which aims to create a vast network of infrastructural and commercial links between China and countries across the world. China’s relations with Central Asia were built on mutually advantageous commercial trade after the fall of the Soviet Union. Beijing has invested heavily in the region’s infrastructure, building roads, railroads, and pipelines in addition to supporting mining and energy projects. China, the region’s largest trading partner, has pushed to fortify ties by establishing free trade zones and providing loans and subsidies to support regional development. This economic participation has been followed by an expansion in security cooperation as China seeks to protect its economic interests and manage any security dangers.
One of the main drivers for China’s security commitment in Central Asia is the alleged threat of terrorism and extremism emanating from the region. China’s westernmost province, Xinjiang, which borders Central Asia, has long been a source of concern for the nation due to the potential for upheaval there. The Chinese government has accused the Uyghur ethnic minority of being separatists and religious extremists behind terrorist attacks in Xinjiang and other parts of China. In the region of Xinjiang, the Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities have experienced severe Chinese persecution. As the area has a same ethnocultural heritage with the Uyghurs, China sees Central Asia as a potential source of funding and a safe haven for anti-Chinese actions. It has sought to establish stronger security ties with the local administrations in order to counter this threat.
As part of its security cooperation, China has offered military supplies, training, information sharing, and joint exercises to Central Asian countries. China has also established a new regional security forum, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which was established by China, Russia, and the four Central Asian countries. The SCO has been praised as a venue for regional security cooperation and has held joint military exercises and counterterrorism operations. China has established bilateral security agreements with several Central Asian countries, two examples of which being a strategic partnership with Kazakhstan and a security cooperation deal with Tajikistan. One of the key facets of China’s security participation in Central Asia is its focus on border security and counterterrorism. China has provided military equipment and training to Central Asian countries to help them control their borders and deter the entry of terrorists and extremists. China has further helped Central Asian countries with intelligence collecting.
China and the Russian Federation have had distinct goals in post-Soviet Central Asia throughout the three decades after the fall of the Soviet Union. While Beijing has increased its soft power as a consequence of its expanding economic relations with Central Asian countries, Moscow continues to seek to retain its strategic control in the region. In a recent Nowruz welcome to Tajik President Emomali Rahmon, Chinese President Xi Jinping said that China was putting up an effective plan to develop relations with Central Asia. President Xi sent a similar message to President Shavkat Mirziyoyev of Uzbekistan.
As China’s security footprint in Central Asia grows, speculation that it would eventually overtake Russia as the region’s primary security supplier is fed. China now has a larger interest in the security dynamics of the region as a consequence of its rising economic and political influence, while Russia has historically dominated the security environment in Central Asia. While Russian influence in the post-Soviet Central Asian countries continues to diminish, China is expanding its economic and political clout. In the area of security in Central Asia, China is making progress. In the last five years, it has supplied 18% of the region’s armaments, a considerable rise over the 1.5% of Central Asian arms imports it made between 2010 and 2014. China initially constructed military outposts in Tajikistan’s Pamir Mountains in 2016, and since then it has been expanding the operational capabilities of its paramilitary troops in the region. Beijing and Moscow are bridging the strategic chasm, and if current trends continue, Moscow’s hegemony may one day be challenged.
Despite the fact that due to a lack of understanding of the region, Russia’s influence in the post-Soviet Central Asian republics has been declining, Central Asia continues to be an important source of hydrocarbons and a crucial transit hub for China’s BRI in support of China’s expanding economic interests there. Beijing and Moscow have thus been secretly competing with one another to increase their influence in the region. However, Beijing is unmistakably reaping strategic benefits from the altering regional dynamics brought forth by the Ukrainian problem.
While China’s security cooperation in the area is still relatively new and mostly focused on counterterrorism and border protection, Russia and Central Asian countries have a long history of military and security collaboration. The old Soviet Union has been a major factor in regional security worries ever since it fell apart. As China’s economic influence in the region grows, so will its security presence. However, it is unlikely that it would ever completely displace Russia as a key player in regional security issues.
China’s growing security presence in Central Asia affects Indian ambitions in the region. India is concerned about how the BRI has allowed China to tighten its control over the politics, economics, and security of Central Asia. China’s economic activities in Central Asia have the potential to make these countries more dependent on China, which might limit their capacity to pursue independent policies. China’s debt trap approach has historically hurt countries in Central Asia. Debt is a problem for Central Asian low-income nations like Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Due to their failure to return the Chinese loan, Beijing now has control over the mining rights and territory gains in these nations.
The rising influence of China in Central Asia worries India, but there are also benefits for Delhi. The countries of Central Asia see India as a geopolitical counterbalance to China. In addition to the debt trap, the Chinese BRI has other issues. These include ineffective risk management, a disregard for details, and a lack of cooperation between the concerned local governments, private businesses, and state-owned firms in China. As an alternative, India’s connectivity projects, such as the International North-South Transport Corridor and the Chabahar Port project in Iran, are unaffected by politics and completely promote regional connectivity.
India has recently increased its significant involvement with Central Asian countries in an attempt to counteract China’s growing influence in the region. By providing military supplies and training to the armed forces of Central Asian countries, India has also made an effort to expand its security cooperation with those countries. As a consequence of the First India-Central Asia Summit in January 2022, India established a Joint Working Group (JWG) on Afghanistan, a JWG on the Chabahar port, and monthly meetings of the national security advisers of India and Central Asian nations. These three initiatives are consistent with India’s revised Central Asia strategy, which aims to increase cooperation on regional security, Afghanistan, and connectivity. The paper claims that in order to offset Chinese dominance in Central Asia, a strong Indian presence is required.
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