Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi met Afghanistan’s acting Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi and publicly emphasised that China is ready to work with Afghanistan to carry forward the traditional friendship, enhance political mutual trust, deepen practical cooperation, bring more benefits to both countries and contribute to regional peace and stability. Apart from this announcement another statement which caught attention was “Afghanistan is ready to upgrade its ties with Pakistan” and both Afghanistan and Pakistan agreed to send ambassadors to each other’s country. This clearly showed that China is trying to reshape South Asian politics by leveraging the existing China-Pakistan-Afghanistan trilateral framework.
To further extend this cooperation the Sixth China-Pakistan-Afghanistan meeting was held in Kabul on 20th August, 2025 where all the three sides agreed for cooperation in Security, law enforcement, and people-to-people connect. Parallel to this China also developed a China-Pakistan-Bangladesh trilateral framework whose first Foreign Minister/Foreign Secretary meeting was held in Kunming (China) on 19th June, 2025 and all the parties agreed to advance cooperation based on the principles of good neighborliness, equality and mutual trust, openness and inclusiveness and common development. These meetings and new trilateral agreements indicate a qualitative shift in China’s South Asia strategy in which it is transitioning from bilateral cooperation to structured trilateral mechanisms for better networked regional influence in South Asia.
China’s growing trilateral diplomacy in South Asia is not occurring in a strategic vacuum and interpreted as a counter to India’s expanding trilateral framework in South Asia through which India is trying to consolidate influence in its immediate neighbourhood and the Indian Ocean. One of the examples of India’s expanding trilateral framework in South Asia is the India-Sri Lanka-UAE agreement to develop Trincomalee Harbour as a logistics hub which got signed on 5th April, 2025 and signalled India’s intent to work with extra-regional partners to stabilise and economically anchor South Asian states. Another example is India-Nepal-Bangladesh trilateral agreement signed on 3rd October, 2024 under which all parties agreed upon the exchange of 40 megawatts of electricity from Nepal to Bangladesh via Indian territory. Against this backdrop, China’s trilateral initiatives with Pakistan and Afghanistan and with Bangladesh and Afghanistan indicate a strategic counter to India’s trilateral diplomacy in South Asia.
Another persistent driver of Beijing’s trilateral initiatives in South Asia is inefficacy of South Asia’s formal regional organizations, particularly SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) and BIMSTEC (Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation). SAARC has remained dormant for more than a decade now due to political and bilateral disputes between India and Pakistan which intensified more after the Uri attack of 2016, and BIMSTEC, despite being operational, has not delivered what was expected from it due to limitations in terms of funding, project implementation, and institutional depth. Now because of inefficiencies of SAARC and BIMSTEC South Asia has now become the least integrated region in the world in terms of trade where intra-regional trade accounts only for 5% and this has created a space for foreign players like China to engage with South Asian countries by promising them a platform for regional cooperation.
Despite China’s efforts to grow a trilateral network in South Asia it also faces some serious political and structural challenges that can affect the long term sustainability of its trilateral agreements in South Asia. The most immediate challenge is the fragile relationship of Pakistan and Afghanistan which came into doubt again after the clash between both countries in late 2025 which resulted in the death of 70 civilians and left 477 people injured. This clash disrupted diplomatic engagement and reinforced mutual distrust between Afghanistan and Pakistan which puts a question mark on any effort at coordinated regional connectivity or reconstruction. Some experts also argued that without a durable bilateral stabilization between Pakistan and Afghanistan any China led trilateral will become procedural rather than implementable framework.
A second major challenge in front of China is domestic political volatility in Bangladesh which was visible during the July 2024 student uprising which resulted in the fall of the Government in Bangladesh. The interim government of Bangladesh has repeatedly emphasized that its participation in China-led trilateral is strictly issue specific rather than political, reflecting concerns over domestic legitimacy and regional signalling. This political instability in Bangladesh has had broader implications also as this volatility can weaken the predictability required for a long term cooperation. Taken Together, it can be said that China’s trilateral network in South Asia is very much likely to remain contingent and transactional until the bilateral relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan becomes stable and a new and permanent government in Bangladesh forms.
In conclusion, China’s recent focus towards trilateral diplomacy in South Asia marks a clear and visible shift from bilateralism to networked trilateralism. This strategy by China is partly reactive to counter India’s expanding trilateral engagement in South Asia and partly opportunistic to fill the gaps created by inefficiencies of SAARC and BIMSTEC. Along with opportunities this strategy also has some constraints raised due to clashes between Afghanistan and Pakistan and an uncertain political environment in Bangladesh. So, the future of China’s trilateral network now depends on the relationship of Pakistan and Afghanistan and the perspective of the new Bangladesh Government after the elections.