On the 60th anniversary of Singapore’s independence, archival accounts and historian insights shed light on the tense, covert negotiations that led to the “bloodless coup” of 9 August 1965, ending a two-year union with Malaysia.
On the morning of 9 August 1965, Singaporeans woke to news that would change their history.
At 9.30am, in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysian Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman told Parliament that Singapore was leaving the Federation of Malaysia. Barely three hours later, in Singapore, Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew appeared on television.
His voice broke, his eyes brimmed with tears, and he called it “a moment of anguish” — the end of the merger he had fought for just two years earlier.
For decades, the story would be told as a sudden expulsion.
Yet, archival records, memoirs, and even a 1965 U.S. Embassy telegram reveal a more complex truth: the separation was the outcome of secret talks, calculated risks, and decisions made by a handful of leaders under intense political pressure.
The road to merger
The Malaysia Agreement, signed on 9 July 1963, was meant to reunite Singapore, Sabah, Sarawak, and Malaya. For Lee Kuan Yew and the PAP, merger was both a nationalist goal and a political necessity.
As historian Dr Thum Ping Tjin explained in a 2015 interview, “In 1957, a survey found 90% of Singaporeans in favour of merger. It wasn’t just an ideal — if you wanted to win elections, you had to be openly for reunification with Malaya.” Lee himself saw merger as a platform to influence politics in Kuala Lumpur and perhaps rise to lead a united Malaysia.
But the terms of merger were not equal. Singaporeans could only vote in Singapore. PAP politicians could not contest mainland seats. These restrictions limited Lee’s ambitions from the start.
Early rifts
On 31 August 1963 — just over two weeks before Malaysia’s formal formation — Lee declared Singapore’s unilateral independence and called a general election. This blindsided Tunku Abdul Rahman.
The September 1963 elections pitted PAP against Malaysia’s ruling coalition, Barisan Nasional (BN). BN lost every seat it contested, including three Malay-majority constituencies in Singapore. For Tunku, it was a warning: Malay voters on the island were not reliably UMNO supporters.
In 1964, PAP broke another informal pledge by contesting 11 mainland seats in Malaysia’s general election. Only Devan Nair won — in Bangsar — but the move was seen as a direct challenge to UMNO’s political dominance.
1964: Riots and mistrust
Relations soured further with the 21 July 1964 racial riots in Singapore. Scores were killed, hundreds injured, and mutual trust eroded.
Dr Thum notes that Lee, who had once used racial arguments to push for merger, now began championing a “Malaysian Malaysia” — equal rights regardless of race.
For UMNO leaders, this reversal appeared opportunistic and threatening.
In December 1964, during a golf game, Tunku proposed to Goh Keng Swee a looser federation: Singapore would leave Malaysia’s Parliament but still pay for defence and surrender control over Malay affairs on the island. Goh rejected the terms as politically unacceptable.
1965: A choice takes shape
By mid-1965, the political relationship was beyond repair. In June, Lee delivered his “Malaysia for Malaysians” speech at the Malaysian Solidarity Convention, earning his wife Kwa Geok Choo’s praise but further alienating UMNO.
In July, while recovering from illness in London, Tunku decided Singapore must leave.
On 15 July, Malaysian ministers Dr Ismail Abdul Rahman and Ja’afar Albar met Goh in Kuala Lumpur. The meeting began as a criticism of Lee but turned into a proposal for separation. Goh agreed in principle, warning that delay would only strengthen Lee’s position.
Only Lee, Goh, Law Minister E.W. Barker, and Finance Minister Lim Kim San were aware. On 26 July, Goh arrived with a handwritten note from Lee authorising him to negotiate. Barker began drafting the separation agreement.
Risk and secrecy
The talks carried enormous personal risk. If they failed, Goh and Barker could be charged with sedition under Malaysia’s constitution. One telephone conversation between Goh and Lee was conducted in halting Mandarin to keep the operator from understanding.
On 3 August, Tun Abdul Razak presented Tunku’s conditions: Singapore must contribute to Malaysia’s defence budget and avoid foreign defence pacts. Goh sidestepped these points, saying Singapore lacked resources to build a military.
By 6 August, the draft was nearly final. That night, Goh and Barker travelled to Kuala Lumpur to complete the deal. They negotiated late into the night. When Barker returned, Lee reportedly thanked him for delivering “a bloodless coup”.
Cabinet resistance
On 7 August, Lee revealed the plan to the PAP Cabinet. Opposition came from Foreign Minister S. Rajaratnam and Deputy Prime Minister Toh Chin Chye, who saw separation as a betrayal of Sabah and Sarawak allies. They even considered contacting communist militants to resist a Malaysian takeover — an idea Lee rejected.
By 8 August, preparations moved quickly. PAP leaders spread the news to party activists across Malaysia. That night, the separation documents were printed in secrecy in Serangoon. The British were informed only after signatures were secured.
9 August 1965: Announcements in two capitals
At 9.30am, Tunku told the Malaysian Parliament that Singapore was leaving. The constitutional amendment passed, but only after Tunku warned Alliance MPs he would resign if they refused.
According to the U.S. Embassy telegram, this ultimatum damaged Tunku’s image as a unifier but cemented his dominance over the Alliance. Only one senior figure — UMNO Secretary-General Ja’afar Albar — defied him, and was forced to resign.
At noon, Lee addressed Singaporeans in an emotional broadcast. Behind the public grief was a political reality: by leaving Malaysia, Lee secured unchallenged leadership in Singapore.
Shockwaves in Malaysian politics
The separation left no one fully satisfied. The U.S. Embassy reported that only the communist-influenced Socialist Front and some far-right Malay nationalists appeared pleased.
Malay extremists in UMNO were bitter. Some younger members might have followed Albar in a revolt, but he publicly pledged loyalty to Tunku while quietly working to strengthen his position.
Among the Chinese political class, the reaction was sharp. MCA youth were furious that their leaders had allowed what they saw as the “ejection” of 1.5 million Chinese from Malaysia, weakening their bargaining power.
MCA leader Tan Siew Sin told party youth that separation was a tragedy but unavoidable, placing blame on Lee and urging unity.
Economic calculations
On paper, Malaysia lost significant resources with Singapore’s departure. The loss of promised development funds for Borneo was cited as a blow, but cooperation had already been minimal. Singapore’s commitment to a M$150 million loan was conditional on labour access for Borneo — a point never agreed.
Economic ties, however, could not be severed easily. While tariffs and quotas on Malaysian goods caused initial animosity, both governments recognised their interdependence. A “common market” remained possible, and many businessmen were optimistic trade relations could be repaired if politics stayed out of the way.
Nation-building in Singapore
For Lee, independence meant both a political victory and a new challenge. Dr Thum notes that Lee had to abandon the Malayan identity he had championed since 1959 and instead emphasise a distinct Singaporean identity.
Policies shifted towards English and Chinese as dominant languages, while Malay remained the national language in name. Economically, Singapore moved towards an open, export-driven model, free from Kuala Lumpur’s protectionist policies.
Sixty years later
Today, Singapore marks its 60th National Day with a clearer understanding of 1965’s events. The separation was not a sudden ejection but the outcome of covert manoeuvres, calculated risks, and political trade-offs.
It was, in Lee’s words, a “bloodless coup” — and one that set both nations on divergent but enduringly connected paths.