In his oft-cited address at this year’s Davos confab, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney warned of nothing less than “a rupture in the world order”, where even the “pleasant fiction” of a rules-based international order has succumbed to a “harsh reality” of power politics. In his thinly veiled criticism of US President Donald Trump, who has threatened closest neighbours and allies with tariffs and even military assault, the Canadian leader warned that America’s partners have the option to “diversify to hedge against uncertainty” in American foreign policy.
Having just visited China weeks earlier, where the two sides explored a new partnership after years of acrimonious relationship, the Canadian leader clearly signalled that key Western nations see the Asian superpower as a potential alternative partner. Shortly after Carney’s speech, UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer followed suit in visiting Beijing, a timely trip which immediately ended the almost decade-long diplomatic “ice age” in bilateral relations and, crucially, culminated in a series of consequential economic and diplomatic deals.
For his part, French President Emmanuel Macron visited Beijing in December, where the two sides agreed to work together “to make global economic governance fairer, more just and equitable.” In response, a visibly irked Trump warned allies that it’s “very dangerous for them to do that, and it’s even more dangerous, I think, for Canada to get into business with China.”
While Europe and Canada have an option to pivot to the Asian superpower to enhance their own strategic autonomy, the same can’t be said for America’s frontline partners in Asia – most notably the Philippines and Taiwan. If anything, for leaders in Manila and Taipei, China represents a primary national security threat. Trump’s open infatuation with China’s Xi Jinping, and his cavalier attitude towards allies and international law, will only reinforce a sense of insecurity among frontline Asian partners that both depend on “iron-clad” American military support as well as a rules-based international order.
When Trump first came to power, he enjoyed widespread support among Asian partners most threatened by China. After all, the US president openly broke with decades-long policy of economic engagement with China in favour of a more confrontational approach. Accordingly, Washington expanded military aid to and deepened security cooperation with both Manila and Taipei.
No wonder then, his return to power in 2025, was met with cautious optimism in Asia.
But as the recently released US National Security Strategy (NSS) and National Defence Strategy (NDS) demonstrate, Trump’s swashbuckling foreign policy reflects a fundamental shift in American foreign policy. While the NSS barely mentions collective deterrence measures against authoritarian superpowers, the NDS calls on allies to promote self-reliance when dealing with threats more directly affecting them rather than America. Trump’s second term could usher in a new world order dominated by superpowers – if not an outright condominium between Washington and Beijing.
This represents a potential nightmare for frontline partners in Asia, who are fretting over the lack of clarity on American military commitment in the event of a contingency.
Trump’s penchant for deployment of “shock and awe” military force against weaker adversaries could strengthen the hands of more hawkish elements in Beijing, who have little regard for international law. As the Stanford historian Stephen Kotkin argues, authoritarian powers may not have elections, but they have fierce internal factional and often even sincere ideological debates on foreign policy issues. This is particularly poignant in light of Chinese paramount leader Xi Jinping’s comprehensive purge of the “old guard” in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), most notably veterans who had been more cautious about military adventurism.
As PLA special forces’ recent “decapitation” drills demonstrate, China is, similar to the immediate aftermath of the Gulf War and the Third Taiwan Straits crisis in the 1990s, quickly drawing operational lessons from the most recent US military actions, including the seamless abduction of the Venezuelan strongman.
Given its deep reliance on international law and American military assistance, the Philippines is arguably even more vulnerable than the better-equipped and more competently led neighbouring Taiwan. If anything, leading Filipino experts fear that China, which has been irked by the Philippines’ aggressive public diplomacy and maritime resistance in the South China Sea in recent years, would soon build dual-use structures on the hotly disputed Scarborough Shoal – a contested feature that lies just over 100 nautical miles from Subic Bay naval base and under Beijing’s de facto control following a naval standoff with Manila in 2012.
Against this backdrop, top Filipino politicians and China’s Embassy in Manila have been engaged in a war of words in recent weeks. Newly arrived Chinese Ambassador Jing Quan, having previously served in Washington, offered to relinquish his position should the Malacañang Palace declare him persona non grata. Eager to avoid a dangerous escalation in bilateral relations, President Ferdinand Marcos reassured China that he remains committed to diplomatic engagement over the South China Sea.
In neighbouring Taiwan, meanwhile, the main opposition party Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT), which controls the parliament, is already reaching out to Beijing – with no less than its current chairwoman describing China as “family” and maintaining that Taiwan should not “pick a side” between the two superpowers. In the Philippines, pro-Beijing senators and, most notably, the Duterte family, will likely press for greater accommodation of China amid fears of a more unpredictable regional order. If not outright “decapitation”, a more aggressive campaign of elite co-option is beckoning China.
In short, Trump is inadvertently empowering both hawks in Beijing as well as China-friendly elements in frontline partner nations.