Takaichi’s earlier remarks on Taiwan have made foreign policy a key pillar of the election campaign, signalling a harder security line that has intensified tensions with China
Just three months into her prime ministership, Sanae Takaichi announced a snap election scheduled for 8 February, seeking to legitimise her policy agenda through a popular mandate and to strengthen the Liberal Democratic Party’s (LDP) position in the lower house. While the campaign has focused primarily on domestic economic issues, such as the rising cost of living, tax relief, wage growth, subsidies, and social welfare, foreign policy and diplomacy also feature prominently as one of the five pillars of the party’s election platform (令和8年政策パンフレット).
In unveiling the manifesto, Takayuki Kobayashi, Chair of the LDP’s Policy Research Council, warned that “complex crises, such as attempts to change the status quo by force, have become the norm around the world,” asserting that Japan would establish a system capable of responding to a new era and defending itself “to the end”. Historically, LDP election manifestos have avoided direct reference to Taiwan. Breaking with this convention, however, the present manifesto explicitly states that “peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait are important” (令和8年政策パンフレット).
Historically, LDP election manifestos have avoided direct reference to Taiwan. Breaking with this convention, however, the present manifesto explicitly states that “peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait are important”.
The Taiwan issue moved to the forefront of political debate soon after Takaichi assumed office. At a House of Representatives Budget Committee meeting late last year, Katsuya Okada, a senior figure in the opposition Constitutional Democratic Party, questioned her about remarks she had made during the 2024 LDP leadership campaign regarding what might constitute a “survival-threatening situation” for Japan. At that time, Takaichi had suggested that a Chinese naval blockade of Taiwan could fall into this category. In her initial response as PM, she reiterated her predecessors’ position, stressing that any determination would depend on the specific circumstances.
When pressed further, however, Takaichi stated that if China were to use military force against Taiwan, such as through a naval blockade, it would likely constitute a survival-threatening situation for Japan, thereby obligating Tokyo to respond. This interpretation implied that Japan could respond militarily under such circumstances and potentially invoke the collective security provisions of the 2016 Peace and Security legislation, which permits the use of force under specific conditions. Japanese officials later suggested that her remarks were unscripted. Tokyo’s official position has consistently maintained that the Taiwan issue should be resolved peacefully through dialogue. Nonetheless, the distinction between an unscripted remark and an official statement by a sitting prime minister proved difficult to sustain, and the attempt at damage control came too late.
China responded with full-throttle condemnation, invoking Japan’s militarist past and colonial history while accusing Tokyo of aggression. Takaichi later conceded that her remarks went “beyond the government’s established stance,” as no Japanese prime minister had previously explicitly referred to a military contest over the Taiwan Strait as a “survival-threatening situation”. Despite this acknowledgement, she stood by her comments and did not retract them.
Beijing’s claim over the Japan-administered Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu in China), combined with unresolved historical grievances, sustains instability in the East China Sea, reflected in frequent aircraft scrambles and Chinese incursions into Japan’s territorial waters.
Although Takaichi is the first sitting prime minister to have made such a statement about Taiwan, senior LDP figures have previously employed similar language. In 2021, then Deputy Prime Minister Taro Aso remarked that “if a major problem were to occur in Taiwan, it would not be an exaggeration to say that it could be related to a survival-threatening situation for Japan”. China reacted sharply, with Foreign Ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian stating that Aso’s remarks “harmed the political foundation of China–Japan relations” and that Beijing “resolutely opposed” them.
Takaichi’s Taiwan remarks have further strained already tense Japan–China relations. Beijing introduced retaliatory measures, including restrictions on Japanese seafood imports and the suspension of certain flights and shipping services. The last two remaining Pandas in Japan also returned to China amid heightened tensions, thus ending the “Panda diplomacy” that began in 1972.
The sharpest response came in a rather undiplomatic post on X on 8 November by China’s Consul General in Osaka, Xue Jian, who called to “cut off that filthy neck,” an apparent reference to Japan’s leader. Although the post was later deleted, the incident underscored the depth of diplomatic deterioration.
While Taiwan remains China’s primary strategic red line, structural factors shape the tensions. Beijing’s claim over the Japan-administered Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu in China), combined with unresolved historical grievances, sustains instability in the East China Sea, reflected in frequent aircraft scrambles and Chinese incursions into Japan’s territorial waters.
Official and social media narratives highlighting Okinawa’s history as the former Ryukyu Kingdom seek to legitimise discourse on independence and exploit long-standing local opposition to the heavy US military presence, adding a non-military dimension to regional tensions.
Japan’s vulnerability is reinforced by geography. Yonaguni lies just 111 kilometres from Taiwan, and Okinawa hosts the majority of US forces in Japan. Given China’s intensified drills across the region, Japan and the United States have stepped up force posture adjustments across the southwest archipelago.
China has also increased political pressure, leveraging state-controlled information channels. Official and social media narratives highlighting Okinawa’s history as the former Ryukyu Kingdom seek to legitimise discourse on independence and exploit long-standing local opposition to the heavy US military presence, adding a non-military dimension to regional tensions.
Yet, given Japan’s increasingly volatile security environment and the central role of US forces under the Japan–US Security Treaty, the concerns of Okinawan residents have received limited attention from both Tokyo and Washington. China exploits this discontent to drive a wedge between Okinawan aspirations and Tokyo’s broader strategic orientation.
Takaichi’s Taiwan gamble has resonated well in the domestic political arena. Public opinion polls indicate that support for Taiwan in Japan remains high, with 74 percent of respondents backing engagement in the Taiwan Strait. The prime minister has also maintained strong personal approval ratings. In one survey, 44.4 percent of respondents said they supported the tough stance she has taken toward the Chinese government, while 21.8 percent expressed disapproval.
As the polling date approaches, Takaichi has maintained a high overall approval rating, both as head of government and as leader of the Liberal Democratic Party. Depending on the polling agency and question framing, her approval ratings range from 59 percent to just below 70 per cent. These figures suggest that Takaichi is well-positioned to form her second administration.
Takaichi’s Taiwan gamble has resonated well in the domestic political arena. Public opinion polls indicate that support for Taiwan in Japan remains high, with 74 percent of respondents backing engagement in the Taiwan Strait.
How the Taiwan and China issues unfold in the coming months will be closely watched both within Japan and across the region. While the US broadly supports Japan’s right to defend its territory and maintains an alliance commitment to Japan’s security, there have been few direct responses from Japan’s regional strategic partners, including India. New Delhi has responded with strategic caution, seeking to reinforce its partnership with Japan while neither publicly endorsing nor criticising Takaichi’s comments on Taiwan. This reflects India’s overarching emphasis on autonomy and balance in Indo-Pacific geopolitics.
Takaichi has announced plans to issue a new National Security Strategy and related defence policy documents in the latter half of 2026. That these revisions are scheduled less than four years after the previous update in December 2022, following a nine-year gap, underscores a shift in Japan’s strategic thinking in response to a deteriorating security environment—particularly regarding China, Taiwan, and Japan’s territorial defence.