With elections approaching, Bangladesh finds itself at the centre of intensifying US-China competition in the Bay of Bengal, testing its ability to balance rival strategic pulls
As Bangladesh’s upcoming election on 12 February approaches, tensions are palpable not only between the contending political parties but also among the country’s top bilateral partners. Days after he was appointed the US envoy to Bangladesh, Brent Christensen expressed concern over China’s growing presence in South Asia and the risks Dhaka could face if it chose to align with Beijing. Beijing, in turn, described these remarks as irresponsible and unfounded, urging Washington “to be more aware of its responsibilities and focus on actions that are conducive to Bangladesh’s stability.” Both the US and China have crucial geopolitical interests in the country, and the electoral outcome will shape their respective fortunes in South Asia, as well as Bangladesh’s own identity as a strategic balancer or a swing state.
Both the US and China have crucial geopolitical interests in the country, and the electoral outcome will shape their respective fortunes in South Asia, as well as Bangladesh’s own identity as a strategic balancer or a swing state.
Situated at the peak of the Bay of Bengal, Bangladesh overlooks shipping lanes in this maritime space that are vital for trade in energy and other important resources. It is thus well placed to provide a strategic foothold for maintaining a presence in this sea and ensuring freedom of navigation. The country also has substantial hydrocarbon reserves in the Bay of Bengal. In a future riddled with uncertainty over energy resources, Bangladesh’s potential as a strategic partner is therefore significant. Its geographic location as a land bridge between South and Southeast Asia, its burgeoning youth population, and its rapidly growing economy have further enhanced its potential as an investment destination. China and the US are among Bangladesh’s most consequential bilateral partners and hold significant stakes in the nation’s development.
China’s Western Maritime Gateway
For China, Bangladesh can provide maritime access to its landlocked western provinces of Yunnan and Tibet, thereby helping Beijing mitigate its ‘Malacca Dilemma’. Coined by former Chinese Premier Hu Jintao in 2003, the term refers to China’s apprehensions about its vulnerability in the Strait of Malacca, through which nearly 80 percent of its trade, including energy imports, passes. The safe passage of these flows is critical to sustaining the world’s second-most populous country and second-largest economy, but the chokepoint remains vulnerable to disruption by both state and non-state actors. China is thus keen to maintain an active presence in the Bay of Bengal and to develop alternative access routes by partnering with Bay littoral states such as Bangladesh and Myanmar. A prime example is the strategic China-Myanmar oil and gas pipeline system, which transports crude oil and natural gas from Kyaukphyu on Myanmar’s western coast to China’s Yunnan Province, providing Beijing with a shortcut that bypasses the Strait of Malacca. In this context, Bangladesh is a critical participant in China’s flagship development project, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), through which Beijing is engaged in extensive infrastructure construction and financing across the country. Coupled with China’s role as Bangladesh’s largest source of imports, robust bilateral ties remain vital to Bangladesh’s development and sustenance.
China is thus keen to maintain an active presence in the Bay of Bengal and to develop alternative access routes by partnering with Bay littoral states such as Bangladesh and Myanmar.
The US’s Strategic Anchor in the Bay
The US also plays a significant role in Dhaka’s growth and prosperity. Bangladesh gained greater prominence in Washington with the renewed US focus on South Asia, the articulation of the “free and open” Indo-Pacific framework, and the revival of the Quad in 2018. Amid China’s increasingly assertive rise, Bangladesh serves as a strategic foothold for the US to sustain its presence in the Indian Ocean. Bangladesh was also the third-largest recipient of US aid in South Asia, and its stern counterterrorism measures made it a crucial partner in Washington’s fight against terrorism. The US remains Dhaka’s most important export market, while its role as an import source is comparatively limited. US engagement has largely concentrated on Bangladesh’s energy sector, banking and finance, and the ready-made garment industry.
Ties in Transition
While the former Sheikh Hasina-led government prioritised a ‘diplomacy of balance’ in its engagements with foreign powers, including China and the US, ties with Washington grew increasingly strained towards the end of her tenure as Dhaka’s proximity to Beijing deepened. Although Bangladesh released a neutrally worded Indo-Pacific Outlook that broadly aligned with the American Indo-Pacific concept, it refrained from joining the US’s Indo-Pacific Strategy, which carried explicit anti-China connotations. While Hasina initially assuaged US concerns, ties deteriorated steadily, culminating in visa restrictions and other measures ahead of the January 2024 election.
Beijing, on the other hand, reassured Hasina of Chinese support in withstanding US pressure. Previously, the Chinese ambassador to Bangladesh had warned that bilateral ties would be damaged if Dhaka joined the Quad, shortly after China supplied Bangladesh with emergency Covid-19 vaccines. Nevertheless, Bangladesh demonstrated diplomatic deftness by acknowledging China’s assistance while firmly asserting its autonomy in making independent foreign policy choices. Beijing has since refrained from overt political intervention in Bangladesh, but has steadily deepened trade and investment ties and expanded bilateral cooperation with the country.
Since then, China’s ties with Bangladesh have only strengthened — even more than under the former Awami League government — as Yunus has prioritised Beijing in several strategic choices, at times overlooking diplomatic sensitivities in Bangladesh’s other bilateral relationships, particularly with India.
American geopolitical analyst Robert Kaplan once observed: “Unlike America, China does not come armed with a missionary approach to world affairs. It has no ideology or system of government it seeks to spread. Moral progress in international politics is an American goal, not a Chinese one.” Indeed, there has been little disruption in China’s ties with Bangladesh despite the change in government in August 2024, when Sheikh Hasina was ousted from power and replaced by Chief Advisor Muhammad Yunus at the head of an interim government. Since then, China’s ties with Bangladesh have only strengthened — even more than under the former Awami League government — as Yunus has prioritised Beijing in several strategic choices, at times overlooking diplomatic sensitivities in Bangladesh’s other bilateral relationships, particularly with India. This was most evident in Bangladesh’s decision to invite China to work on the Teesta Project and rebuild the airbase at Lalmonirhat, both of which would bring Beijing very close to the Indian border.
While it had been anticipated that the Chief Advisor’s close rapport with the former Biden administration would help repair ties between Dhaka and Washington, Donald Trump’s victory in the 2025 US presidential election once again raised doubts. A Trump-led US — while less ideologically invested in projecting democracy as an explicit, front-and-centre pillar of foreign policy than under the Biden administration — is more inclined towards transactional bargaining, as reflected in the ongoing US-China tariff wars. Washington is therefore likely to adopt a more confrontational posture if Bangladesh aligns too closely with China, thereby denying the US a necessary foothold in the Bay of Bengal.
Yunus has remained open to partnerships with the US, given Washington’s role in driving Bangladesh’s economy, employment, competitiveness, and overall economic performance. He met Alex Soros, the son of US billionaire George Soros, days after the Trump administration paused all foreign aid, to discuss reforms aimed at rebuilding the economy. Both countries have also held talks to identify ways to boost American exports to Bangladesh and address existing trade imbalances. Media reports suggest that the US seeks to build a port in Bangladesh under the Quad Ports of the Future Partnership. It has held a preliminary meeting with key stakeholders and is expected to undertake a comprehensive feasibility study before advancing concrete proposals.
A Trump-led US — while less ideologically invested in projecting democracy as an explicit, front-and-centre pillar of foreign policy than under the Biden administration — is more inclined towards transactional bargaining, as reflected in the ongoing US-China tariff wars.
The Way Forward
While the interim government has sought to strengthen Bangladesh’s ties with both partners, it remains a temporary arrangement that will soon be replaced by an elected administration. The incoming government is expected to be more representative of the people’s choices. Historically, both China and the US have maintained amicable ties with the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, and both are currently keen to deepen engagement with Jamaat-e-Islami, one of the largest contending parties in the upcoming election. As speculation mounts over the electoral outcome, both partners are keen to retain their influence in Bangladesh in pursuit of their respective national interests. China has entrenched itself through deep infrastructure investments in Bangladesh, while the US remains the country’s largest export market. Amid these geopolitical push-and-pulls, Bangladesh must preserve its strategic autonomy during and beyond the election.