As a small state, Singapore naturally cannot escape the pressures of great power rivalry and global changes. But as a country that is well governed, safe, stable and prosperous, Singapore can serve as a model for others to study or emulate, says former journalist Goh Choon Kang.
The sweeping global transformation has created unprecedented dangers for the survival and development of small states. How to respond to and mitigate the resulting compounding pressures has become the greatest challenge for governments and people all over the world.
The simultaneous external pressures from various sources test not only the political wisdom and governing ability of those in power, but also the unity and resilience of a nation’s people. The increased external pressure underscores the greater need to maintain composure and autonomy.
The bitter struggle between China and the US has produced spillover effects that directly impact every country in the Asia-Pacific region — especially for small countries, which must be flexible in their response.
Moving towards a multipolar world
The greatest pressure that small states face comes from the fierce rivalry between major powers as well as the restructuring of the world order. The bitter struggle between China and the US has produced spillover effects that directly impact every country in the Asia-Pacific region — especially for small countries, which must be flexible in their response.
The post-Second World War order is also undergoing a paradigm shift, resulting in the rise of various uncertainties. The rise and fall of Chinese and American power in the region would most likely change the regional balance of power. Small states must hence remain highly vigilant.
During the Cold War, the hostile blocs led by the US and the Soviet Union formed a clear division that resulted in a bipolar world. Since both sides possessed nuclear weapons, a balance of terror and relative stability emerged, with the East and the West each developing within their own camps. Small states were led by the two powers respectively, each one finding its own place.
After the split between China and the Soviet Union, there was talk of a tripolar world: that is the US, Soviet Union, and a third world consisting of developing countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America. It could arguably have been a tripolar world, but the notion of the “third world” gradually faded in light of China’s reform and opening up. A unipolar world was said to have formed with the collapse of the Soviet Union — until the US and China turned from friends into rivals.
It is generally thought that the world is moving towards a multipolar era, but the form this multipolarity would take remains unclear. In addition, there is also the distinction between the so-called Global North and Global South. In sum, it is a chaotic world: the old order is dying while the new one is yet to be born. This disorderly world has ramped up the risks to the survival and security of small states.
Carving out spheres of influence
For Southeast Asian countries, the most direct impact is the pressure to choose a side, even though both China and the US verbally deny having such intentions. The saying “when elephants fight, the grass suffers” rings true.How to ensure national security and avoid becoming collateral damage and being dragged into the vortex of conflict, or being reduced to cannon fodderis a thorny problem facing all small states.
If Trump truly intends to change the US’s longstanding military presence in Europe and the Asia-Pacific, the regional balance of power would inevitably undergo fundamental changes.
Secondly, the possible change to the balance of power maintained by the major powers in the Asia-Pacific region would inevitably create tremendous psychological pressure on the small states of the region.
The US’s recent release of its National Security Strategy (NSS) broadly reflects President Donald Trump’s strategic outlook: no longer acting as the world’s policeman, taking care of the Western hemisphere (the US’s “backyard”), avoiding military confrontation with China, as well as demanding that Europe take care of its own defence and security. This is a Trump-styled Monroe Doctrine. Trump likes to act unilaterally and is even more enamoured with doing business and striking deals.
If Trump truly intends to change the US’s longstanding military presence in Europe and the Asia-Pacific, the regional balance of power would inevitably undergo fundamental changes. Asian and European countries, which have been under the American security umbrella since the Second World War, would have no choice but to wholly reassess their decades-long political, economic and military policies.
The world might thus return to an era in which great powers carve out spheres of influence. In Asia, small states naturally pay close attention to China’s moves. Beijing declared that no matter how strong it becomes, it would never seek hegemony. If this proves true, it could shape a new model of great power conduct. But for small states, concrete guarantees are even more important. If for instance a legally binding code of conduct in the South China Sea can be negotiated and signed as soon as possible, it would help maintain regional stability.
… small states must first be able to continuously strive for self-improvement. Second, they must find ways to strengthen unity and cooperation, so as to strike a way out and maintain autonomy in these perilous times, rather than be reduced to being manipulated and exploited by major powers.
Gaining bargaining power
Thirdly, pressure comes from major powers weaponising economic and trade relations. The US has turned its back on globalisation and has weaponised trade. Trade wars have become an important aspect of China–US rivalry. Small states that rely on the markets of major powers must now confront the frequent use of economic tools by those powers — including import restrictions, tariff hikes and the cutting of supply chains.
In the face of simultaneous pressures, how should small states act and relieve the strain? There are no simple or quick fixes; however, one thing is certain: small states must first be able to continuously strive for self-improvement. Second, they must find ways to strengthen unity and cooperation, so as to strike a way out and maintain autonomy in these perilous times, rather than be reduced to being manipulated and exploited by major powers. Third, they must do their best to uphold international law and multilateralism.
In international relations, small states are generally only price takers that lack bargaining power. To gain bargaining power and avoid being constantly suppressed, there is no other alternative but to huddle up and combine their strength, as ASEAN member states have done. Ten arrows tightly bound together are undoubtedly harder to break than one on its own.
However, great power rivalry also places enormous divisive pressure on ASEAN and other groupings of small states. In ASEAN’s case for example, Cambodia’s heavy economic dependence on China would mean it feels stronger pressure to take China’s side. The Philippines, meanwhile, is highly dependent on the US for security, and faces pressure to align itself more closely with Washington.
Even the European Union (EU) is now mired in an unprecedented predicament. NATO members have long relied on US protection, saving on defence spending, while also receiving a steady supply of cheap Russian gas that was conducive to industrial and commercial development. Now all of this has vapourised overnight, leaving them struggling to make ends meet, with their public finances, industry and commerce in crises.
Thus, the EU must urgently change course. One of its responses is to increase cooperation and exchanges with other small- and medium‑sized countries in order to seek self-preservation.
That is to say, the crisis has also created new opportunities for cooperation among small- and medium‑sized states. Whether they can turn danger into safety depends on whether their political leaders can seize the moment and establish new mechanisms for multilateral cooperation.
Each country and regional organisation has different resources and strengths. By pooling their capabilities, they can aid and complement one another, exchange what they have for what they lack, expand markets and strengthen supply chains. This can also reduce various dependencies on major powers and, in geopolitical terms, allow them to maintain greater autonomy and exercise greater agency.
The Singapore example
As a small state, Singapore naturally cannot escape the multifaceted pressures amid these great changes. It must work closely with like-minded countries to vigorously uphold a rules-based international order. However, the country must also recognise the changing circumstances and be fully prepared to adapt to the new world order. Singapore’s new prime minister and cabinet have only recently taken office, yet they have already launched fresh diplomatic initiatives, extending Singapore’s links to Africa and South America and expanding its circle of friends based on its existing relationships. This helps to disperse various external pressures.
… to move forward steadily amid upheaval, Singapore must always maintain autonomy in its international relations and keep mutually beneficial and balanced ties with all major powers.
Secondly, to move forward steadily amid upheaval, Singapore must always maintain autonomy in its international relations and keep mutually beneficial and balanced ties with all major powers. At the same time, Singapore should leverage the collective strength of ASEAN member states to enhance regional autonomy.
Compared with many developing small states, Singapore is in fact better placed to cope with external pressures in this era of great change. First, it is a successful country that does not need to bow down to others or beg. Diplomacy is to a large extent an extension of domestic governance. A failed state can scarcely play a role internationally; hence the saying, “weak countries have no diplomacy”. A successful small state, by contrast, can rely on its own strength to play a role on the international stage and win the respect of others.
Moreover, Singapore is also a country that is of use to the world. One’s value is determined by their usefulness, and they can thus win people’s favour — the same is true of states. Singapore is useful to the world in many ways: from its beginnings as an entrepot, it has gradually developed into an aviation hub, a financial centre, a transport hub and the regional headquarters location for many global corporations and more, providing the region and the world with a wide range of modern, efficient and competitive services.
Singapore’s good governance and political stability have themselves become assets of practical value to others. A country that is well governed, safe, stable and prosperous can serve as a model for others to study or emulate. Singapore must continue to consolidate and build on these advantages, so that it might progress steadily and go the distance amid great changes.