In September 2025, mass protests in Nepal led by Generation Z over social media censorship, corruption and economic stagnation forced former prime minister Khadga Prasad Sharma Oli’s resignation. For Beijing, Oli’s fall represents a political setback but not a turning point, as China seeks to preserve its influence in Nepal while adapting to shifting local dynamics.
Oli’s exit was significant because he was widely recognised as a ‘pro-China’ figure. During his three terms as prime minister — 2015–2016, 2018–2021 and 2024–2025 — China and Nepal developed close political ties. The two governments signed many agreements and memoranda of understanding (MoUs), opening avenues for collaboration on connectivity, energy and transportation.
In 2017, Nepal signed an MoU on the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Between 2018 and 2021, Oli advanced planning for several flagship projects such as the Trans-Himalayan Railway and cross-border power transmission lines. And in 2019, Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Nepal, culminating in 20 new agreements and the declaration of a ‘strategic partnership’. Nepal also endorsed Xi’s Global Development, Global Security and Global Civilization Initiatives.
Oli continued this trajectory after returning to office in July 2024. During an official visit to China in December that year, he expressed his willingness to expedite an MoU on the Trans-Himalayan Multi-Dimensional Connectivity Network and to further BRI cooperation. Just days before his resignation, Oli was again in China to attend the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit. His abrupt fall thus unsettled Beijing, raising questions about the continuity of Chinese projects and influence in Nepal.
Officially, China reacted cautiously. At a routine press conference, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs described Nepal as a ‘friendly neighbour’ and urged all parties to restore social order and political stability at the earliest opportunity.
But Chinese media discourse has been more varied. Some Chinese commentators have focused on the structural causes of the crisis, arguing that it was rooted not in the social media ban but in deeper issues, including dependence on remittances, pervasive corruption and weak institutions. As Xinhua Daily noted, ‘Without effective governance capacity, even the best-designed institutions can hardly function.’
Others highlighted the generational divide underpinning the protests, driven by Generation Z emphasising youth unemployment, disillusionment with corruption and widespread hopelessness about the future. Commentators also stressed that the social media ban was not merely a technical restriction, but disrupted communication channels for Nepal’s overseas workers, striking a particularly sensitive social nerve.
Another perspective casts the turmoil as indirectly influenced by external actors, including non-governmental organisations — framing Nepal’s internal politics as entangled with great power competition in the region. In Chinese public opinion, this provides a logical basis to stress China’s role as a stabilising force.
Together, these narratives allowed the Chinese media to reinforce two interpretive frames — Nepal’s political instability stems from deep structural weaknesses and external interference exacerbated them.
Placed alongside the government’s cautious statements, media analyses point to Beijing’s broader strategic objectives in Nepal and the region, both political and economic.
On the political front, China promotes itself as a counterweight to Indian and Western influence, arguing that Beijing’s closeness with South Asian countries makes them less reliant on other regional or international powers. To this end, it stresses principles such as ‘sovereignty’ and ‘non-interference’ — downplaying politically-sensitive security concerns and projecting an image of China as a non-coercive actor. This posture has occasionally been undermined by reports of the Chinese ambassador to Nepal meeting leaders from various political parties in Kathmandu, fuelling speculation about Beijing’s role in the country’s internal affairs.
Economically, China argues that it seeks to strengthen economic cooperation to foster predictable developmental dividends. In doing so, smaller states such as Nepal are encouraged to view China as a reliable partner in their external relations. While the BRI has faced criticism for pushing vulnerable countries into ‘debt traps’, Nepal’s ambassador to China, Krishna Prasad Oli, has dismissed such claims as ‘totally misguided’.
Following the formation of the interim government under former chief justice Sushila Karki, Beijing quickly recalibrated. China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs congratulated Karki and reaffirmed the ‘time-honoured friendship’ that China and Nepal share. The statement emphasised China’s respect for Nepal’s independent choice of its development path and expressed Beijing’s willingness to work with Nepal to uphold the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and advance bilateral relations. Soon after, China’s ambassador to Nepal, Chen Song, met Karki at her office, delivering Beijing’s congratulations. The two discussed ways to strengthen bilateral ties and enhance ‘mutually beneficial cooperation’.
Oli’s departure is a setback for Beijing, given his track record of alignment with Chinese priorities. But it is not a turning point for the country’s ties with Kathmandu. Due to the nature of the Nepal–China relationship, whoever is elected to the office after the March 2026 elections will certainly engage with China, though the style, tone and intensity of engagement may differ.
Bian Sai is PhD candidate at the School of International Relations and Public Affairs, Fudan University and Academic Visitor at the Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore.
Amit Ranjan is Research Fellow at the Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore.