China’s recent energy trajectory is less a story of transition and more a cautionary tale of fossil-fuel persistence. Between 2023 and 2025 Beijing presided over a surge in coal approvals, construction and imports that—taken together—amount to deliberate policy choices that lock in emissions, aggravate public-health burdens and prop up a global coal market that the world can ill afford. The facts from 2023–2025 are stark and simple: China expanded the physical and financial infrastructure for coal at scale, even as operational data show coal-fired generation rising. Those are policy choices with measurable consequences.
Independent trackers documented that China began construction on roughly 94.5 gigawatts (GW) of new coal-fired power capacity in 2024—the highest level of coal-power construction in nearly a decade—and approved about 66.7 GW of additional coal capacity in the same year. These are not marginal projects: a single new coal gigawatt often represents multiple large plants with lives of 25–40 years. Building nearly 100 GW in one year creates a long-lived emissions pathway that will be extremely costly to unwind later.
The operational picture confirms the practical result of those approvals. Official and market data showed thermal (predominantly coal) power generation rose by about 1.5% in 2024, reaching roughly 6.34 trillion kWh. That increase demonstrates a basic reality: new coal capacity is not idle symbolic infrastructure—coal generation grew even as new plants were being added, keeping absolute emissions elevated. In short, approvals plus use equals more carbon in the atmosphere.
The supply side reinforced demand. China’s total coal imports jumped to a record about 542.7 million tonnes in 2024, an increase of roughly 14% year-on-year. Seaborne volumes alone exceeded 400 million tonnes according to several marine and market trackers. Rising imports tighten global coal markets, provide revenue certainty for exporters and miners, and signal that supply constraints at home are being filled from abroad rather than through structural demand reduction. That international dimension multiplies the climate effect of China’s domestic choices.
These three hard data points—permitting, commissioning, and imports—create a classic “carbon lock-in.” Coal plants are capital-intensive, long-lived assets whose economics favor continued operation once built. Approving and constructing them now makes future emissions reductions far more expensive and politically fraught: retiring a newly built coal plant early imposes heavy write-downs on utilities, exposes lenders to losses, and requires substitution by other firm resources. In practice, approval pipelines and import contracts set the geopolitical and financial parameters that make decisive near-term reductions less likely.
The pattern is not purely technical; it is political. Provincial revenue models, industrial reliability priorities, and utility accounting rules create incentives to green-light coal projects. Where central targets collide with local economic priorities, local permitting and financing often win. The result is a governance gap: national rhetoric or long-range pledges are being undercut by municipal approvals, bank credit and state-owned enterprise investment that favor coal because it promises short-term jobs or fiscal receipts.
Coal’s misuse is not only a climate problem; it is a human-health crisis. Multiple peer-reviewed studies and major health assessments link coal combustion to elevated PM2.5 exposure, cardiovascular and respiratory mortality, and substantial disease burdens across Chinese provinces. The Lancet Countdown and other analyses have repeatedly documented that air pollution from coal remains among the leading environmental causes of premature death in China.
By continuing to expand coal infrastructure and imports, China also distorts investment signals. Banks, provincial treasuries and equipment suppliers respond to visible pipelines; when the pipeline prioritizes coal, private capital is less likely to fund alternatives that would meaningfully reduce dependence. Moreover, higher imports and continued domestic commissioning boost global coal demand and prices periodically, sustaining export industries and new mine investments elsewhere—an international knock-on effect from policy choices made in Beijing.
The raw numbers from 2023–2025 are undeniable: approvals of tens of gigawatts, nearly 100 GW under construction in 2024, a rise in coal generation and record import volumes. Those are not technical glitches or temporary blips; they are the material expression of policy choices. If the international community and China itself treat coal expansion as a problem to be managed rather than an active misuse to be reversed, the consequence will be higher emissions, avoidable health burdens and a more expensive transition later. The data recommend urgency: dismantling the financial, political and market supports for new coal is the clear next step if China wants its long-term climate and public-health commitments to mean anything real.
References and Hyperlinks
Global Energy Monitor & CREA, “When Coal Won’t Step Aside: China’s 2024 Coal Approvals” (Feb 2025). Available: https://globalenergymonitor.org
Reuters, “China 2024 thermal power output hits record 6.34 trillion kWh” (Jan 2025). https://www.reuters.com
Reuters, “China’s 2024 coal imports hit record 542.7 million tonnes” (Jan 2025). https://www.reuters.com The Lancet Countdown 2023 Report, “Health and Climate Change: China Briefing”. https://www.thelancet.com