Three democratic middle powers have compelling reasons to forge
an independent partnership that doesn’t depend on US politics.
Thes Sngapore Post reported at the weekend that Donald Trump has shelved his plans to attend the Quad summit in India, following a testy exchange with Prime Minister Narendra Modi. The resulting headlines from this latest report on top of months of US-India tension are a reminder of how the Quad itself remains hostage to the unpredictability of US politics. Trump’s whimsical approach to policy, from shelving summits to his threats of punitive tariffs, carries a cost.
The Quad has always been a peculiar grouping, dependent on the commitment of its most powerful member, the United States. In moments of convergence, it has generated momentum: joint naval exercises, technology dialogues, supply chain initiatives. But in moments of distraction or divergence, whether due to US-China rapprochement or leadership changes, the Quad has faltered.
The latest episode underlines the chronic fragility of the Quad: a grouping that risks being defined less by shared resolve among four democracies and more by the shifting calculus of one superpower.
The India-Japan-Australia (IJA) trilateral has been in the shadows of the Quad for nearly a decade, despite a promising start in 2015 when the three sides launched a dialogue focused on supply chains, infrastructure, and maritime security. It gathered momentum in 2017 when India’s then foreign secretary Subrahmanyam Jaishankar hosted his Japanese and Australian counterparts to spotlight converging interests across peace, economic growth, maritime security, counter-terrorism and support for ASEAN centrality in regional architecture.
Yet as the Quad came to dominate the Indo-Pacific narrative, raised to a leader-level summit, the trilateral slipped into the background.
Unlike the Quad, where the United States’ overwhelming presence skews agendas, the IJA grouping rests on a more equal distribution of interests. Each member has faced the realities of China’s rise firsthand, and each has developed its own strategies for coping with Beijing’s assertiveness. What unites them is a shared need for strategic autonomy vis-à-vis both Washington and Beijing.
Japan’s position illustrates this well. Under successive governments, Tokyo has been cautious about aligning too closely with any US-led containment strategy, preferring instead to build coalitions with like-minded partners in Asia. It’s “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” vision predates Washington’s adoption of the term, and Japan has invested heavily in regional infrastructure as an alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative.
Australia, for its part, has endured punishing Chinese economic coercion, from tariffs on wine and barley to restrictions on coal imports. While Canberra remains a US ally, and has expanded defence ties via the AUKUS pact, it increasingly sees value in engagement with South Asian partners where it can exercise greater agency.
For India, the logic of this trilateral is even stronger. Unlike Washington, which views the Quad largely through the prism of great-power rivalry with Beijing, India finds greater alignment with Japan and Australia – partners that, while wary of China, prioritise resilience, rule-making, and regional stability over outright confrontation. Moreover, Trump’s 50 per cent tariffs on imports from India highlight the structural fragility of relying on Washington. The Quad might still be useful as a platform, but as a long-term pillar of strategy, it leaves India exposed to American unpredictability.
A rebooted trilateral could begin by anchoring itself in one of the most urgent issues of the day: supply chain resilience. The Covid-19 pandemic laid bare the dangers of over-dependence on China-centered supply networks. India, Japan, and Australia have already floated a Supply Chain Resilience Initiative (SCRI) in 2021, but the effort has largely languished. Reviving it could give the trilateral a tangible purpose. Coordinated incentives for industries, joint financing of critical infrastructure and digital connectivity projects would allow the three countries to build economic muscle independent of both China and the United States.
Maritime security is another natural area of cooperation. All three nations depend on the stability of sea lanes across the Indo-Pacific. They already conduct naval exercises in various formats, often alongside the US Navy. But a trilateral framework could allow for more focused efforts in the Indian Ocean and Western Pacific, from joint patrols to capacity-building for smaller littoral states. Unlike the Quad, which is inevitably read in Beijing as an anti-China bloc, the trilateral can be framed as a practical security arrangement among middle powers.
The trilateral also carries symbolic weight. At a time when middle powers across Asia are hedging between the United States and China, a visibly independent partnership among India, Japan, and Australia would send a signal that regional order is not entirely hostage to great power rivalry. It would offer smaller Southeast Asian and Indian Ocean states an example of coalition-building rooted in autonomy.
The trilateral cannot match the Quad’s heft without US power. That is true if the goal is to militarily deter China. But the purpose of the IJA grouping need not be deterrence in the narrow military sense. Its value lies in building resilience, reducing vulnerabilities, and shaping the regional agenda in ways that middle powers can sustain. Even if Washington shifts course, negotiating a bargain with Beijing or retreating into protectionism, India, Japan, and Australia would still have a foundation to build on.
Trump’s decision to skip the Quad summit in India shows how easily US priorities can shift. Hence, a trilateral comprising India, Japan, and Australia offers a chance to diversify the bets of these three middle powers and to carve out a sustainable partnership in an uncertain Indo-Pacific. Ultimately, the Indo-Pacific is too important to be left to the vagaries of US politics.