Despite a diplomatic thaw, India’s trust in China remains fragile, strained by mega infrastructure projects, deepening China-Pakistan ties and a growing presence in the Indian Ocean, says Indian analyst Rishi Gupta.
In a significant diplomatic development in India-China relations, Indian Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar visited China on 14 July to attend the foreign ministers’ meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. This was his first visit to China since the Galwan conflict at the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the border area in April/May 2020.
Among his high-level interactions, Minister Jaishankar had a summit-level meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping and bilateral exchanges with Vice-President Han Zheng as well as Politburo member and Foreign Minister Wang Yi.
Minister Jaishankar’s visit was also the highest-level from India to China since the signing of the Agreement on the Peace and Tranquillity Along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas in October 2024, exhibiting the resumption of political dialogue between the two countries.
Engagements resume
Shortly after the border agreement was signed in October, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping met on the sidelines of the BRICS summit in Kazan, Russia, on 23 October 2024. Besides the leaders’ meeting, there have been visits by the Indian Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh and national security adviser Ajit Doval for key bilateral meetings to comprehensively resolve border issues and take people-centric steps to stabilise and rebuild ties.
As a result of these government-level engagements, both sides have opened doors for visitors and visa issuance, deepened economic engagement and resumed the “Kailash Mansarovar Yatra”. This religious pilgrimage takes Hindu pilgrims to Mount Kailash (also known as Mount Kangrinboqe), revered as the abode of Hindu Lord Shiva and a sacred mountain for Tibetan Buddhists.
… the Indian public remains sceptical of China’s intentions, particularly regarding Beijing’s activities that affect India’s national security.
Besides the government-level engagements, Beijing is seen making efforts to engage with India’s media and intellectual community by hosting them for Track II dialogues. Direct flights between India and China could be the next area of progress, having been a recurring topic of discussion for both sides, notably during Minister Jaishankar’s recent China visit.
While regular political interactions have facilitated the reopening of people-to-people ties, the Indian public remains sceptical of China’s intentions, particularly regarding Beijing’s activities that affect India’s national security.
Let’s understand what has kept the Indian press and public opinion divided on whether to trust China.
Chinese mega-dam weaponises water?
Among the most recent events contributing to the trust deficit is China’s decision to build a mega-dam on the Yarlung Zangpo, also known as the Brahmaputra in India. The dam is regarded as the biggest dam in the world and hailed as the “project of the century”. On 25 July, citing the Xinhua report, the South China Morning Post reported that the cost of dam construction is around 1.2 trillion RMB (US$167 billion), which was formally approved in December 2024.
Reacting to the Xinhua report on the approval of the dam, the spokesperson of India’s Ministry of External Affairs said in January, “As a lower riparian state with established user rights to the waters of the river, we have consistently expressed, through expert-level and diplomatic channels, our views and concerns to the Chinese side over mega projects on rivers in their territory.” As a major river flowing from Tibet, it is a lifeline to India’s northeastern region, and the building of the dam is expected to impact the water availability in India.
China’s upstream dam construction raises not just ecological concerns, but existential questions: are these projects part of a larger strategy to control a vital lifeline?
Besides India, the dam would also impact Bangladesh, through which the river flows before ultimately emptying into the Bay of Bengal. While India and Bangladesh have raised their concerns, Beijing responded by adding, “To build the hydropower project in the lower reaches of the Yarlung Zangbo River is fully within China’s sovereignty. The project aims to speed up clean energy development, improve local people’s life, and proactively respond to climate change.”
While water and environment experts are still estimating the project’s impact on lower riparian countries like India and Bangladesh, for the strategic community, China’s upstream dam construction raises not just ecological concerns, but existential questions: are these projects part of a larger strategy to control a vital lifeline?
For China watchers in Delhi, Beijing’s construction of the mega-dam is widely viewed as an attempt to weaponise water, with the resulting ecological damage carrying serious long-term implications. Although India and Bangladesh have been at odds since the fall of the Sheikh Hasina government last year, both nations have independently voiced concerns over the dam — potentially creating rare common ground for cooperation.
In India, the dam has also become a flashpoint in public opinion toward China. While the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s aggressive posture along the LAC in 2020 had already dealt a severe blow to bilateral ties, new issues like the dam continue to deepen the distrust.
China’s ‘iron-clad’ friendship with Pakistan
Secondly, China’s reported support for Pakistan during India’s anti-terror strikes on terror establishments in the Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir in May this year has also been a sensitive issue.
The “all-weather friendship” between Beijing and Islamabad is fundamentally a strategic bargain built on reciprocity. China offers unwavering support for Pakistan on the Kashmir dispute, while Pakistan unconditionally accepts the “one China” policy. This reveals a partnership driven less by ideology and more by mutual geopolitical leverage.
Meanwhile, during Operation Sindoor, which was “launched to respond to a barbaric cross-border terror attack by Pakistan-sponsored terrorists”, China’s diplomatic and material support to Islamabad was visibly noted in India.
… the popular Indian view questions Chinese intentions — perceiving a contradiction as it seeks peace along the LAC with India while simultaneously strengthening Pakistan militarily.
Pakistan reportedly used Chinese-supplied weapons, including J-10C fighter jets, in an airpower battle with India. With China being the biggest defence supplier to Pakistan, the popular Indian view questions Chinese intentions — perceiving a contradiction as it seeks peace along the LAC with India while simultaneously strengthening Pakistan militarily. On 24 July, Foreign Minister Wang Yi hosted Pakistani army chief Asim Munir in Beijing, an event that attracted close scrutiny from India.
Munir’s red-carpet welcome in Beijing — coming closely on the heels of his visit to Washington — has only heightened apprehensions in India. It reinforces the perception that China’s “iron-clad” embrace of Pakistan is driven less by a shared vision for regional stability, connectivity or development, and more by strategic alignment that targets India.
Adding another layer to this relationship is the transactional value China places on Pakistan — not only as a strategic partner but also as a host market for major Chinese investments. This includes the multi-billion-dollar China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and a slew of infrastructure projects across Balochistan.
However, security concerns persist. The Baloch Liberation Army, a separatist group in Pakistan, has increasingly targeted Chinese nationals, with several fatal attacks on project sites. In response, Beijing continues to press Islamabad for stronger guarantees to protect Chinese personnel, projects and institutions operating in the region.
Grey zone activities in the IOR
Besides a mega-dam and support to Pakistan, China’s grey zone activities in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), including the docking of the dual-purpose research ships in Sri Lanka and the Maldives, have caught the attention of the Indian security establishment.
In the ongoing Monsoon Session of the Indian parliament, responding to a question by a lawmaker on China’s growing presence in the Indian Ocean, the minister of state in India’s foreign ministry said, “The Government is aware of China’s stated objective of becoming a ‘maritime power’. As part of this strategy, China is developing ports and other infrastructure facilities in the littoral countries in the Indian Ocean Region.”
… the public perception in India continues to see China through the prism of deep suspicion and strategic mistrust…
The minister also commented on China’s naval presence in the Indian Ocean, stating, “China also has naval and maritime presence in the IOR, including through anti-piracy escort missions, port calls and deployment of research and survey vessels.” While members regularly question India’s foreign policy, the timing of their inquiries often reflects the urgency of specific issues pertinent to their local constituencies, including those amplified by China’s growing presence in the IOR.
To conclude, the political and military understanding reached in the last ten months between Delhi and Beijing has been instrumental in easing the working-level relationship between the two countries. However, the public perception in India continues to see China through the prism of deep suspicion and strategic mistrust. To shift this perception, Beijing must now commit to sustained diplomatic transparency and demonstrably credible actions.