Despite speculation about leadership challenges, evidence suggests Xi Jinping holds firm control over China’s political system.

In recent weeks, a flurry of reports has predicted the imminent downfall of China’s President Xi Jinping. Similar rumours have surfaced repeatedly over his 13-year rule – and each time have proven false. While scepticism about Xi’s invincibility is warranted, history suggests that today’s chatter will likely also turn out to be unfounded.
To be sure, something strange is happening in Beijing. Since Xi began his third term in 2022, several of his hand-picked appointees have been removed, prompting speculation about a power struggle in the Chinese Communist Party. Most of the activity has occurred in the military, leading some to conclude that Xi is losing control of the armed forces. But not all analysts agree with this assessment. Some see the intrigue as evidence of Xi’s further consolidation of power or even as infighting among his subordinates that has no effect on him.
Despite the noise, no one has credibly explained how a leader who dominates every significant CCP organisation could be toppled. All seven members of the Politburo Standing Committee are either long-time Xi allies or have served him loyally for over a decade. More than half of the broader Politburo’s 24 members are his protégés, and nearly all the others had direct ties to him prior to their appointments. The factions rumoured to be plotting against Xi lack meaningful representation in the bodies that appoint and remove senior officials. The notion that these sidelined groups have somehow outmanoeuvred a political operator as shrewd and relentless as Xi strains credulity.
Nor has Xi made a recent blunder so catastrophic that it would convince his allies that his continued rule is a liability to the Party. His Covid-19 strategy collapsed in 2022, resulting in a year of widespread lockdowns that stalled economic activity, threatened social stability, and saddled provincial governments with dangerous levels of debt. But that was three years ago. Instead of punishing Xi, the Party awarded him a precedent-breaking third term and allowed him to further consolidate his control.

For all the turbulence of Xi’s tenure, the CCP generally views him as a success. Xi has presided over China’s rise as a global power and reasserted the Party’s control of society more comprehensively than any leader since Mao. Though his handling of the economy and of US-China relations has drawn some criticism, few believe removing him would erase US tariffs or improve China’s global standing. If anything, Xi is credited with forcing Washington back to the negotiating table in the latest trade standoff.
Some reports claim that Zhang Youxia, vice chairman of the Central Military Commission and a longtime Xi ally, is plotting his removal – possibly through a coup. If true, this would be seismic. However, these assertions stem from overseas dissident outlets with a mixed track record for accuracy. Crucially, they offer no compelling explanation for why Zhang would turn on Xi, especially after Xi retained him in 2022 despite Zhang’s having surpassed the customary retirement age.
Much of the narrative around Xi’s supposed decline relies on selective, often decontextualised, observations. Critics point to his absence from this week’s BRICS Summit in Brazil but overlook his three overseas trips so far this year – consistent with recent patterns – and the steady stream of foreign leaders he continues to host in Beijing.
Others overinterpret isolated state media reports that fail to mention Xi’s honorifics, overlooking the fact that most official discourse continues to emphasise his central role. And, contrary to claims of Xi’s declining media presence, a recent China Media Project study found that references to him are holding firm in 2025, with no other senior leader gaining visibility at his expense.
Rumours and coded messages can offer valuable clues about cracks within the Chinese leadership. However, such signals are open to interpretation and often reflect more hopeful speculation than hard evidence.
If Xi’s position were truly in jeopardy, we wouldn’t need to rely entirely on parsing obscure policy documents for clues. Removing the most powerful Chinese leader since Mao would likely resemble past episodes of political upheaval, which brought down some of the most senior Party figures. The turbulent Mao era, for example, saw CCP Vice-Chairman Liu Shaoqi purged and summarily placed under house arrest and his successor, Lin Biao – once Mao’s “closest comrade-in-arms” – killed in a suspicious plane crash while fleeing the country. These are just two examples of a string of decidedly unsubtle events.
Today’s China, by comparison, appears relatively stable. The most senior figure believed to have been ousted during Xi’s third term is He Weidong, a Politburo member and vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, who hasn’t been seen since March. This is significant, but He – admittedly a Xi ally – is not generally understood to be part of his inner circle. If some of Xi’s closest allies – Cai Qi or Ding Xuexiang, for example – are targeted, that will be a more likely sign of trouble for Xi.
If Xi Jinping truly faces serious internal challenges, such overt indicators will eventually appear. For now, however, the evidence suggests Xi remains firmly in control.