
Ahead of mid-term polls, Philippine President Ferdinand “Bongbong” R. Marcos Jr. has intensified his strategic efforts to target China both politically and diplomatically. The midterm polls are due in May.
Amid rising tensions with China, Marcos has chosen to focus on China in election rallies. He has accused his predecessor, Rodrigo Duterte, of being pro-China, stating that the previous government was too eager for the Philippines “to be a province of China.” Marcos Jr. has strongly challenged China due to its illegal claims over the Philippine’s Western Sea.
In a rally in Davao del Norte province, he briefed attendees about how large Chinese ships attacked the Philippine Coast Guard with water cannons. Chinese vessels have engaged in multiple high-profile confrontations with Philippine ships in disputed waters of the South China Sea, despite an international ruling of 2016 declaring that China’s claims have no legal basis. China’s illegal claims over the Philippines’ Western Sea have sparked outrage among the general public of the Philippines.
Unlike in the past, foreign policy—particularly the issue of China—has become a central topic in the elections, with surveys showing that citizens feel strongly about it, stated political analysts. Marcos Jr. also criticized Duterte’s policies concerning China’s intrusion in the West Philippine Sea and the rise of Chinese-operated Philippine Offshore Gaming Operator (POGO) hubs during his predecessor’s tenure, clarifying that his administration had no involvement in these policies.
Marcos has been seeking support from the United States to counter China. He has approved joint patrols and military exercises with the US in the West Philippine Sea and granted Washington access to four additional Philippine military bases under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), which angered China. Two of the newly-approved EDCA sites are located in coastal towns of Cagayan, which are relatively close to Taiwan, a self-ruled island that China considers a renegade province.
The Philippines has also signed defense agreements with allies. For example, it signed a Status of Visiting Forces Agreement (SOVFA) with New Zealand to deepen military ties in the region. This is the third such agreement, following similar agreements with the U.S. and Australia. It has also signed a Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) with Japan, while negotiations are underway for similar pacts with Canada and France.
These alliance-building efforts are intended to garner support from like-minded partners at a time when tensions with China are escalating in the West Philippine Sea. These agreements aim to resist China’s unilateral narrative and preserve international law.
Notwithstanding Marcos’s political and diplomatic efforts to target China, China’s engagement with sections of political leaders is politically motivated. Ironically, China’s investment plan in the Philippines is based on relations with the current political leadership.
Experts stated that China’s appetite for financing Philippine development is erratic and heavily influenced by its relations with political leaders in Manila. An independent U.S. research institution, AidData, noted that under President Marcos, there has been a shift in regional alliances, with the Philippines taking a more assertive stance toward China amid heightened tensions over Beijing’s maritime claims and increased engagement with neighbouring Australia and Japan. According to an article in Philstarwebsite ,AidData reported that this could result in fewer large-scale infrastructure projects but may lead to increased small-scale public diplomacy efforts to build relationships across educational institutions, media outlets, local government units, and the political opposition.
Beijing has financed the Arroyo and Duterte administrations and fast-tracked new projects at an unprecedented rate under former President Duterte, even suggesting in 2018 that China could make the Philippines its own province. According to news reports, China committed financing to 233 projects in the Philippines between 2000 and 2022, worth approximately $9.1 billion, with 91 percent of the financing in the form of debt (high-interest loans) rather than aid. Researchers said that one can see a lot of difference in how China has engaged with the Philippines depending on who is in power.
The research further stated that China is “opportunistic” in ramping up financing to politically significant localities, such as the home regions of senior officials. Davao received significant investments from China, with 85 percent of those projects occurring during Duterte’s tenure. However, strained relations with the Marcos administration are likely to result in a decline in collaboration on new projects.
Furthermore, China has been involved in corrupt practices in the Philippines, exemplified by the high-profile case of Alice Guo, a former mayor accused of graft, money laundering, and espionage. The case highlights China’s infiltration and covert activities in the country. Beijing claims sovereignty over almost the entire South China Sea, including most of the West Philippine Sea, despite an international tribunal ruling in 2016 that dismissed these claims.
Beijing has stepped up its information operations globally, using the Philippines as a testing ground for tactics aimed at spreading anti-American narratives and fostering pro-China sentiment. Chinese accounts amplify content on social media platforms like Facebook and TikTok, casting doubt on Philippine-U.S. relations and eroding social trust within Philippine society. By exploiting internal instability, China seeks to distract Philippine authorities from its aggressive actions in the surrounding seas. According to the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, China has been using strategic investments and covert actions to push Philippine leaders toward a more China-friendly stance. This is part of China’s broader global strategy to build influence through business alliances, economic incentives, and investments targeting elites in other countries. As the Philippines approaches critical elections in 2025 and 2028, China will probably make an attempt to influence or co-opt those who are receptive to its overtures.