On January 3, around 12:40 PM, Chunghwa Telecom reported to Taiwan’s Coast Guard that an undersea communications cable near Keelung had been severed. The Coast Guard sent a patrol vessel to intercept the Hong Kong freighter Shunxin-39. Although they made radio contact and conducted an external inspection, rough seas prevented boarding. International law barred seizing the ship as too much time had passed since the incident. Tracking data indicated Shunxin-39 dragged its anchor where the cable was damaged.
Marine Traffic analysts reported that the freighter had been crisscrossing waters near Taiwan’s northern coast since December 1, leading Taiwanese officials to suspect the cable rupture was not an innocent accident.
Retired US Air Force Colonel Ray Powell noted that the vessel responsible for damaging Taiwan’s submarine cable, Shunxing39, appears to have operated under multiple names (Shunxing39 and Xingshun39), flown two flags (Cameroon and Tanzania), and used six different Maritime Mobile Service Identities (MMSI) during its travels between Taiwan’s Keelung and South Korea’s Busan over the last six months.
Ownership records show the ship, registered in Cameroon, belongs to Jie Yang Trading Limited, a Hong Kong company led by GuoWenjie, a Chinese national. The vessel’s current location is unknown as commercial services have not detected its AIS signal since January 3. The CGA has passed all evidence to prosecutors for a criminal investigation.
In response, Taiwan requested help from South Korean authorities. The suspected vessel is reportedly headed to Busan, South Korea. “Since we couldn’t question the captain, we asked South Korean authorities to assist with the investigation at the ship’s next port,” said a Taiwan Coast Guard official. Despite the damage, Chunghwa Telecom rerouted traffic to other cables, ensuring uninterrupted service. The cable, operational since 2008, links East Asia to the US’ West Coast.
The incident in Taiwan echoes similar disruptions to undersea infrastructure worldwide, particularly in the Baltic Sea, where vital cables and pipelines have been damaged. In October 2023, China was first implicated in undersea cable sabotage when its vessel, the New Polar Bear, damaged the 77-kilometer Balticconnector pipeline, a crucial energy source for Finland. This was accompanied by damage to an undersea data cable connecting Estonia to Sweden. The New Polar Bear then sailed to St. Petersburg, was later seen in the Arkhangelsk region of Russia, and eventually docked in Tianjin, China.
At first, China denied European accusations about the New Polar Bear causing the damage. However, in August 2024, Beijing admitted that the Hong Kong-flagged ship was responsible but blamed the incident on a severe storm. In November 2024, two fibre-optic cables in the Baltic Sea were severed, leading investigators to focus on the Chinese bulk carrier Yi Peng 3.
Germany’s Defence Minister Boris Pistorius called the incidents “sabotage” and “hybrid aggression,” highlighting it was nearly impossible for a ship to accidentally sever multiple cables mapped on charts. In December 2024, Finland launched a sabotage investigation after the Estlink 2 power cable and four telecom lines were damaged. Finnish authorities suspect the Eagle S, a tanker linked to Russia’s “shadow fleet,” caused the damage by dragging its anchor along the sea floor.
Taiwan has experienced similar incidents, frequently targeted over recent years. The island nation has faced numerous attacks on its underwater telecom cables and often cannot determine the perpetrators. Taiwan has sought help from the European Union but still cannot identify the source of the attacks. The increasing frequency of these incidents has raised serious concerns over maritime security and prompted NATO to boost its presence in the Baltic region.
Undersea cables are the unsung heroes of modern communication and energy networks. They form the internet’s backbone and facilitate power transmission across nations and continents. However, these essential infrastructures face rising threats and disruptions. Attacks on undersea cables are not only disruptive; they can also cripple economies and destabilize societies.
Every year, subsea cables are accidentally cut dozens of times worldwide. Key causes include anchor dragging and trawling in busy shipping routes, where cables cross. Anchors or fishing trawls can damage the cables on contact. Another risk is ships dragging anchors along the seabed with force, which can strain and sometimes break or twist the anchor. This can result in a ship unintentionally severing multiple cables or pipelines in one journey.
However, ongoing investigations hint that some recent incidents are not entirely random. Ships involved in these disruptions sometimes leave a trail of damage, pointing to potential deliberate actions testing undersea infrastructure vulnerabilities. Jakub Janda, from the European Values Centre for Security Policy, and James Corera, of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, suggested, “China’s involvement in the recent episodes need not have been direct; it could have been through providing logistics, technology, or intelligence.”
They stated that this strategy could benefit China by using these incidents as testing grounds to evaluate Europe’s response capabilities and resilience. China can enhance its geopolitical strategies by coordinating these attacks while maintaining plausible deniability. These actions highlight China’s growing trend of using unconventional tactics to challenge the West. A significant challenge in addressing these threats is the right of a ship’s flag country to refuse cooperation with investigations. This legal loophole has allowed countries like China to avoid accountability for such incidents. In response to increasing risks to undersea cables and energy infrastructure, NATO launched a dedicated center in May 2024 to enhance protection of these critical assets. However, despite its creation, NATO’s efforts have so far proved ineffective, revealing the center’s inability to prevent or respond decisively to these attacks.