Trump and Harris are two representatives of American politics in West Asia.

In the United States, voters do not directly elect the president. Instead, the Electoral College determines the final result of the elections. Thus, a candidate can win by securing a majority of electoral votes even if they do not achieve a majority of the popular vote. The Electoral College consists of 538 electors, with each state having a specific number of representatives based on its population.

Currently, seven states remain in contention, and victory in these “swing states” could determine the ultimate outcome of the elections. The candidate who manages to gather 270 electoral votes will be declared the winner.

One of these “swing states” is Michigan, home to over 300,000 residents of North African or Middle Eastern descent. Traditionally, these voters have leaned Democratic, but many are disenchanted with Harris’s support for the Israeli genocide in Gaza and the destruction of Lebanon. National polls suggest that Arab Americans show a slight preference for Trump; others are increasingly supporting Jill Stein of the Green Party.

Recently, the New York Times, a media outlet considered close to the Democrats, reported that in over twenty interviews conducted last weekend with a variety of voters in Michigan, only two said they would vote for Kamala Harris. Bruno Maçaes, a Portuguese international politics expert covering the U.S. elections for a British outlet, recounted in an article that in Dearborn, a city where Arab Americans represent 55% of the population, one resident remarked, “No one I know is voting for her.”

It is evident that the situation in Gaza and Lebanon, as well as tensions with Iran, are decisive factors for American voters. Regarding the stance on Israel, there appear to be no significant differences between Kamala Harris and Joe Biden. Both seem disconnected from the younger members of their party, who show a greater interest in the rights of Palestinians and Lebanese rather than the traditional unconditional support for Israel.

In this context, one can recall the statements of Halie Soifer, who served as Harris’s national security advisor during her time as a senator. She stated in an article for Politico: “She and President Biden are in complete alignment regarding Israel. There is no difference between them.”

Kamala Harris made her commitment to Israel’s security and its right to “self-defense” clear during her speech at the Munich Security Conference in early 2024. At this forum, she also emphasized her stance on combating what she referred to as “Iranian aggression and its allies.”

On the other hand, no significant changes to U.S. policy in the region are anticipated from Donald Trump if he wins the election, particularly concerning Iran. The former president takes pride in his withdrawal from the 2015 nuclear agreement, known as the JCPOA, and constantly emphasizes that this action has increased economic pressure on Iran and weakened its influence. However, he makes these assertions without establishing clear objectives regarding the Iranian issue.

Several Iranian analysts point out that Trump might adopt a more aggressive stance toward Tehran. In terms of military presence, his cabinet could opt for a selective strategy, increasing troops and military bases in response to certain threats while withdrawing forces from areas where he does not perceive an imminent danger.

Trump’s policy toward Syria and Iraq is likely to continue along the same lines as in the past, using these countries as tools to exert pressure on Iran. This could involve increasing military presence in these nations, despite a reduction of forces in the Middle East, as well as establishing interactive relationships with parties opposed to Iranian interests within these countries. Additionally, Trump views Iran as the main enemy of the United States in the Middle East, so he is likely to select advisors with hardline views on the Islamic Republic. Although he sometimes speaks of a “great deal” with Tehran, his overall policy will be based on continuing maximum pressure on the Islamic Republic.

Regarding the situation in Gaza, Trump has announced that he will immediately end the war, although it remains unclear how he would do so. In a broader context, his approach is likely to focus on normalization agreements between Israel and Saudi Arabia, sidelining the Palestinians in any decisions about their future.

Concerning Persian Gulf Arab countries, during his first term, the UAE was one of the most solid pillars of the Abraham Accords. If Trump returns to the presidency, it is probable that the United States, through its old ally, will continue its policy toward the Middle East. Given the support he has shown for Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030, if he wins the election, he is likely to offer broader economic backing to the development programs of this country. Furthermore, the normalization of relations between Riyadh and Tel Aviv will be expedited from Washington.

On the other hand, if Harris wins the election, all indications are that she will select her foreign policy team from individuals with experience from the Biden administration. U.S. relations with Persian Gulf countries are expected to continue along the same lines as the current administration.

In the event of a Democratic victory, several Iranian media sources suggest that Kamala Harris will not seek to establish close relations with Iran in the short term. However, they highlight that the nuclear agreement has always been a cornerstone of the Democrats’ Middle East policy, so its review cannot be ruled out. In this regard, we can recall statements from the current Iranian president, Masoud Pezeshkian, who during the electoral campaign stated that one of his top priorities was to achieve a new nuclear agreement.

Nevertheless, the current situation in the region, marked by the genocide in Gaza and the invasion of Lebanon—all actions supported by the United States—seems to preclude any possibility of rapprochement between Iran and Washington.

What is evident is that, regardless of who wins the election in the United States, there will be no significant changes in the unwavering and unconditional support for Israel, nor in its colonial occupation policy, nor in the strategy of “containment against Iran.” While there are differences in how to approach this containment—Trump is likely to restore his “maximum pressure” policy, whereas Harris may opt for a less direct and confrontational approach—both share the narrative that Iran represents an obstacle to their regional reconfiguration objectives.