Last week, Vietnam held its first ever global defence exhibition in an effort to diversify its arms suppliers and move away from Russia. The exhibition provided a chance for allies like the United States and India to strengthen their military ties with Hanoi in addition to providing a message to China about Vietnam’s seriousness about upgrading and diversifying its armed forces.
What role does this expo play in Vietnam’s overall security plan? While preserving positive ties with China is a priority for the nation in order to prevent unwarranted confrontations, it is also searching for ways to lessen the short- and long-term detrimental effects of China’s aggressive actions. Vietnam will counterbalance China until it becomes clear that doing so would be detrimental. The exhibition unquestionably matches the nation’s “Three Nos” non-aligned foreign policy, as it does not bind Hanoi to other nations but rather supports its modernization and weaponry manufacturing instead. However, the crucial query is still, “How can Vietnam balance against China?”
A nation may counter a danger in two ways: internally by producing its own weapons and externally by forming military alliances. Due to its non-alignment, Vietnam has chosen the first alternative while saving the second for a later date. Although it may be tempting to assume that Hanoi’s choice of the first option was the result of its own initiative, failing to recognise the geographic context of that choice makes it difficult to comprehend the systemic forces that have shaped Vietnam’s grand strategy since the country’s founding in 1945. Vietnam’s terrain has forced it to choose the option of domestic balancing since it is profoundly opposed to cultivating an alliance connection with any other major power other than China.
Vietnamese territory is bordered to the north by a powerful China, to the west by the hilly Laos, to the south by the dubious Cambodia, and to the east by a disputed sea. As a result, Vietnam has long lacked strategic depth or a separation between its frontline and its interior. Before the First Indochina War, General Vo Nguyen Giap made the following observations:
“Indochina is a single theatre of operations and a strategic entity. Therefore, it is our responsibility to aid in the liberation of all of Indochina. In particular, due to strategic geography, we are unable to envision an independent Vietnam if imperialism continues to reign in Cambodia and Laos.
Due to its lack of strategic depth, Hanoi will have little time to prepare for a large-scale invasion and would always be forced to rely on itself since an outside force would not be able to act quickly enough.
The 1979 Chinese invasion of Vietnam serves as a prime example. Less than 180 kilometres separate Hanoi from the China-Vietnam border at Friendship Pass, and it took China around two weeks to conquer Lang Son and push more than 50 kilometres into Vietnamese territory. China had the option of directly attacking Hanoi from Lang Son, 120 kilometres distant, but chose to leave after giving Vietnam a quick but expensive “lesson,” in order to prevent Soviet interference.
Due to the South China Sea’s inclusiveness, Vietnam may be able to transfer China’s maritime counterbalance to other major nations with a stake in a free and open Indo-Pacific, freeing up resources for internal counterbalance on land. Additionally, this action is in line with Washington’s dislike of engaging China in a ground battle in Asia. As seen by its supplies of naval resources to Vietnam and its role in contesting Chinese maritime claims, the United States has accepted this strategy. In order to assist Hanoi in addressing its resource shortage in upgrading its military forces and allocating more funds to them, Vietnam, the United States, and other participants in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue should continue to improve their collaboration over maritime security.
A Vietnamese proverb states, “Nuoc xa khong cuu duoc lua gan,” (Distant water cannot put out a nearby fire) which stresses Vietnam’s inclination to constantly rely on itself to balance against China rather than any faraway big power. Vietnam’s closeness to China and lack of strategic depth restrict big powers’ choices for defending the country. Vietnam’s self-reliant security strategy gives it another opportunity to confront the rising power disparity with China, and given that Russia can no longer be relied upon as a supplier, we should anticipate Vietnam to continue the process of diversifying its arsenal. History has demonstrated that securing Vietnam requires a robust army and a large supply of weaponry
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