As the world reels from US President Donald Trump’s sweeping – though now largely paused – “reciprocal” tariffs, next month’s global geopolitical calendar could prove consequential. Nearly every region is on the brink of decisions that could shape the coming years.
Centre stage are Trump’s first state visits of his second term, expected as soon as next month. He will reportedly visit Saudi Arabia first, as well as the United Arab Emirates and Qatar. Trump’s focus highlights Gulf investments in American industry – the UAE has pledged US$1.4 trillion, Saudi Arabia US$600 billion – and critically, may be an attempt to insert himself into Gaza talks.
Trump has floated radical proposals, including resettling Palestinians to transform the Gaza Strip into a luxury retreat. Implausibility aside, such ideas underscore a transactional and disruptive diplomatic style that could deepen Middle East divides.
The tour could also be leveraged for geopolitical theatre: Trump expects to meet Russian President Vladimir Putin in Saudi Arabia, a sort of “reverse Nixon” to draw Russia closer, away from China. The Kremlin has, however, ruled out this meeting.
China is also advancing its diplomatic agenda. After imposing retaliatory tariffs on US imports, President Xi Jinping made Vietnam his first foreign visit this year, on a Southeast Asian tour that included Malaysia and Cambodia – three nations that could be hit hard by US tariffs and retreating development aid.
These visits reinforced China’s Belt and Road Initiative and also rallied Asean against the US threat to free trade and multilateralism. Malaysia, current chair of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, has invited China to the coming Asean-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) summit. This would challenge US-led Indo-Pacific groupings and could institutionalise a new pan-Asia alignment.
This year being the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II, Xi is expected to attend Russia’s commemoration of the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany next month while Putin is likely to visit China to mark the triumph of Chinese resistance against Japanese imperial forces in September. Such visits run counter to Western narratives suggesting the sidelining of Beijing in Ukraine diplomacy, showing a robust China-Russia “comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination”.
In contrast, Xi reportedly declined to travel to Europe for a summit marking 50 years of China-EU ties, supposedly next month, amid frustration with the European Union’s wavering “strategic autonomy”. With Europe embroiled in domestic political crises, the summit may yield little progress.
With the event now reportedly pushed to July in Beijing – breaking the Beijing-Brussels hosting rotation – where EU leaders expect to engage with Xi to jointly counter US tariffs, Europe’s best chance for coherence in engaging China may be at the 6th European Political Community Summit, set for May 16 in Albania.
Proposed in 2022, the summit aims to unite EU and non-EU nations including Ukraine in addressing continental security, economic resilience and democratic values. Whether it can present a united front on trade, security and China, however, remains uncertain. And any vacuum may be quickly filled by external powers eager to exploit Europe’s strategic drift
Meanwhile, the Ukraine war is intensifying with Russia launching its spring offensive. A stronger Russian battlefield position could undermine the fragile peace dialogue championed by Washington.
In East Asia, South Korea’s Constitutional Court recently upheld the impeachment of former president Yoon Suk-yeol, clearing the way for a June 3 snap election. Opposition leader Lee Jae-myung is the leading contender and brings hope of a foreign policy reset, though he risks disqualification amid criminal charges.
His victory could reduce Seoul’s alignment with Washington and Tokyo, bringing increased cooperation with Beijing and a rapprochement with Pyongyang. This is especially as Trump’s tariffs could strain South Korea’s economy and given that Trump’s transactional approach to the North Korea nuclear challenge is likely to bypass Seoul.
In Taiwan, tensions remain high after large-scale mainland Chinese military drills. If Taiwanese leader William Lai Ching-te’s inauguration speech last year is any indication, similar drills can be expected around his May 20 speech should it be provocative. His leadership is under growing strain and his party has called for a sweeping recall of opposition lawmakers amid speculation of a move towards martial law.
Adding to Taiwan’s woes is economic disillusionment. Despite Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company announcing a US$165 billion investment in US chip production, Trump imposed a 32 per cent tariff on Taiwan. Excluded from regional free-trade agreements and facing the prospect of these tariffs, Taiwan may find its New Southbound Policy of closer economic ties with South and Southeast Asia to diversify from the mainland at risk.
This could weaken Lai’s standing before next year’s local elections and the 2028 presidential race, as people grow sceptical of the US alignment.
In the Philippines, the May 12 midterm elections are a stress test for President Ferdinand Marcos Jnr. In facilitating the International Criminal Court’s prosecution of former president Rodrigo Duterte, Marcos has fractured his alliance with Vice-President Sara Duterte, Rodrigo’s daughter.
With the Senate likely to decide on her impeachment post-midterms, the election could determine both her political fate and the Philippine political landscape. A failed impeachment could revitalise the Duterte camp and constrain the Marcos administration’s US-aligned South China Sea policy in the lead up to 2028 election.
From Trump’s revival of Middle East diplomacy to Xi’s strategic counterbalancing, South Korea’s leadership reset to Taiwan’s tensions, Europe’s institutional test to Southeast Asia’s realignment, the coming weeks may offer more clarity on the global order’s next chapter. In a world increasingly defined by bifurcation, transactionalism and strategic hedging, May could well be the inflection point.