Reexamining Thailand’s story of two democracies

Thailand’s longstanding urban–rural political divide is evolving. While Bangkok’s middle class once backed the conservative establishment, many now embrace the reformist Move Forward Party (MFP), whose support extends beyond the capital to rural provinces. Shifting voter behaviour reflects a convergence of urban democratic consciousness and rural reformist aspirations. But true power ultimately remains with the military-backed establishment, which continues to override electoral mandates through constitutional and institutional mechanisms
Conventional wisdom in Thai politics holds that ‘the provinces elect governments, Bangkok overthrows them’. For decades, the socioeconomic and cultural divides between metropolitan Bangkok and the countryside have been understood as the quintessential source of political conflict in Thailand.

Different socioeconomic and cultural realities between the capital and the provinces give rise to competing visions of what democracy is and what it should deliver.

Politicians elected by the rural majority are often seen by Bangkok’s urban middle class as illegitimate, corrupt and incompatible with their ideals of good governance. Frustration with how democracy is practiced outside the capital — riddled with corruption, patronage and vote-buying — drives urbanites to turn their back on the ballot box and take to the streets, welcoming military interventions as a necessary solution to remove governments they deem unfit to rule.

This dynamic is addressed in Anek Laothamatas’s A Tale of Two Democracies, a book that offers not so much a theory as a prophecy of Thailand’s chronic political turmoil. The predictions of this work have remained accurate, even as Thailand’s urban–rural boundaries became increasingly blurred by the flow of rural populations to the Greater Bangkok area, and the rapid urbanisation of the rural hinterlands.

The divide between Bangkok and the countryside has deepened since the 2006 coup that ousted former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra. In every general election that has followed up until 2023, Bangkok and rural areas have remained politically polarised.

Each major movement aimed at unseating Thaksin-led governments has been centred in Bangkok, supported largely by its middle class. These movements are fuelled by accusations that Thaksin and his government have exploited the power of elected office to enrich themselves and his rural supporters.

But recent evidence suggests that the urban–rural divide may be shifting. Allegiances are changing within Bangkok itself, where the Move Forward Party (MFP) won all but one seat in the 2023 Thai general election. Many urban voters previously aligned with conservative, pro-establishment forces have increasingly embraced the MFP’s reformist platform. This amounts to an outright rejection of the royalist-military power nexus — a democratic awakening among the middle class not seen with such intensity since the political upheavals of 1973 and 1991–92.

Yet, the MFP’s success has not been confined to the capital. The party’s popularity has also extended to provinces without major urban centres. Nationwide, the party finished first or second in all 400 constituencies, demonstrating broad support across both urban and rural areas. There has been a convergence of a renewed urban democratic consciousness with rural reformist aspirations.

Despite these developments, the urban–rural divide remains relevant. Rather than being confined to the distinction between Bangkok and the provinces, it now exists within provinces and even within individual constituencies.

Candidates are tailoring their campaigns to both urban and rural electorates. For example, an MFP candidate in a northeastern province emphasised military and conscription reform in urban areas, while focusing on the party’s elderly pension policy in rural areas less receptive to the MFP’s reformist platform. Similarly, a Palang Pracharath Party candidate in northern Thailand prioritised constituency service in urban areas, while relying on networks of local leaders to mobilise support in rural communities.

These variations in strategy have likely given rise to distinct patterns in partisan preferences across constituencies with varying levels of urbanisation. Higher levels of urbanisation — measured by population density, night-time light data and land use patterns — are strongly associated with increased support for the MFP in both constituency and party-list elections.

The United Thai Nation also shows a positive, though weaker, correlation. In contrast, Pheu Thai, Bhumjaithai and Palang Pracharath tend to perform better in less urbanised areas.

While these trends suggest the persistence of the urban–rural divide, they also hint at a transformation, particularly when ballot splitting is considered. Rural voters tend to support one party in the party-list vote while choosing a different party’s candidate in the constituency race. In many rural constituencies, the party that benefited from surplus party-list votes happened to be the MFP.

The bottom line is that although voting behaviour may still differ between those voting in urban and rural constituencies, it does not reflect irreconcilable gaps in democratic understanding. Nor does it suggest that rural voters are less sophisticated, rational or moral in exercising their right to vote.

These political differences rather reflect voters’ choices based on their urban or rural circumstances. For rural voters, this means balancing support for reputable or capable candidates who can address everyday issues unique to rural Thailand with supporting parties that represent their views on national matters.

For now, a cross urban–rural coalition elects the government — but in reality, governments are no longer truly elected, only permitted. The aftermath of the 2023 election illustrated this, when the MFP’s attempt to form a government was blocked by the military-appointed Senate. Despite winning the most seats in parliament through a broad coalition of urban and rural voters, the party was effectively barred from power through institutional mechanisms established under the military-drafted 2017 Constitution. The people may elect governments, but the conservative establishment overrides them.

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