To avoid a catastrophic conflict, China and Taiwan must negotiate a new political agreement, define the nature of their relationship and maintain ‘One Country’ principles instead of sovereignty disputes. Both countries are misled in their belief that military strength can guarantee security and success. Striving for a peaceful resolution through dialogue and respect for each other’s autonomy and political concerns is a more viable pathway to a mutually acceptable and peaceful outcome.
Efforts to fortify Taiwan against decapitation assaults and amphibious invasions can only do so much to prevent conflict with China in the long run. Taipei and Beijing have pushed political boundaries closer to their respective red lines. To prevent conflict, Taiwan and China need to negotiate a new mutually acceptable political framework that clarifies, strengthens and respects each other’s red lines and political concerns.
Taiwan can reassure China’s concerns about ‘independence’ by formally recognising relations as region-to-region, government-to-government, non-state-to-state or a combination thereof. Unlike the 1992 Consensus, such frameworks shift the emphasis from sovereignty disagreements toward defining cross-strait relations while preserving the assumptions of ‘One Country’ included in the 1992 Consensus.
In return, China should recognise domestic pressure in Taiwan against such political agreements by acknowledging cross-strait relations as a non-hierarchical relationship between two equal political entities. China could also recognise and reassure the autonomy of Taiwan’s democratically elected government to govern the ‘Taiwan region’ and participate in international organisations.
Under such a political framework, Taiwan can still assert that it is an independent, sovereign country. China would also maintain space to express its commitment to peaceful reunification.
Taiwan’s Lai administration has faced criticism from the opposition party, Kuomintang (KMT), over its ambiguous position on cross-strait relations. Facing domestic pressure, Lai’s administration could be more open to new cross-strait political frameworks. While Beijing demands the 1992 Consensus as a prerequisite, it could be receptive to renegotiating an agreement that implicitly recognises the consensus.
Current US policy responding to rising cross-strait tensions and China’s military build-up has centred around the ‘porcupine strategy’ of arming Taiwan to deter invasion. While stronger US–Taiwan defence capabilities may affect China’s calculus, relying solely on military means for a political problem would be misguided.
It is a long-standing US policy to support ‘cross-strait dialogue’ and the status quo. Obligations to ensure Taiwan has sufficient defence capabilities do not relieve the United States of its responsibility to support the peaceful settlement of conflict between Taiwan and China. The United States should actively encourage cross-strait dialogue and oppose unilateral changes to the status quo.
Defence-oriented policies place Taiwan under a state of chronic pressure. A war over Taiwan would upend global security through the militarisation of the Asia Pacific, regardless of whether China succeeds or is defeated.
If China successfully ‘unifies’ Taiwan, neighbouring countries and the United States may engage in a rapid military build-up, form a treaty alliance system similar to NATO, pursue total economic decoupling and allow for regional nuclear arms proliferation. China could also face armed insurgency and an uncooperative population.
If Taiwan and the United States repel a Chinese invasion, China could resort to launching long-term, around-the-clock airstrikes against Taiwan and US military assets. A war in the Taiwan Strait is unequivocally a no-win situation.
The military dimension of conflict between Taiwan and China is only peripheral to the underpinning political drivers and is a tool for achieving political objectives.
From China’s perspective, Taiwan’s ‘reunification’ is an essential milestone for party legitimacy and continued rule. China’s enduring view that Taiwan is an inseparable part of its territory compels the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to maintain recognition of the ‘One China Principle’ and prevent official Taiwan independence.
Taiwan, governed by the Republic of China (ROC) government, views the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as a threat to its autonomy. Taiwan, under the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), has asserted the ROC as a sovereign independent country, non-subordinate to the PRC.
China cut off contact with Taiwan under former president Tsai Ing-wen’s administration due to the DPP’s rejection of the 1992 Consensus. Under the 1992 Consensus, the KMT and CCP agreed that both Taiwan and mainland China belong to ‘China’ while refraining from delineating China’s sovereignty as belonging to either the PRC or ROC. Both Taipei and Beijing considered the status of their relations as region-to-region rather than country-to-country.
This agreement addressed China’s top concern of preventing official Taiwan independence. Yet, the consensus neglected Taiwan’s core interest of maintaining its autonomy.
Under the DPP, Taiwan has blurred its position on the nature of relations with the PRC. Taiwan’s President Lai Ching-te has refused to accept the 1992 Consensus under the premise that recognising the consensus equates to accepting China’s ‘One Country Two Systems’ model for unification.
Taiwan, under the DPP, has also pushed for greater recognition of its autonomy. Taiwan has asserted that the PRC has never ruled Taiwan and that the ROC and PRC are not subordinate to each other. China perceives these assertions as Taiwan salami-slicing towards independence because these stances avoid specifying Taiwan’s relationship with ‘China’.
Peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait are in the strategic interest of Taiwan, China and the United States. Yet, with the collapse of trust, an arms race seems like the safest bet to secure national security and achieve political agendas.
Taiwan and China are trapped in an illusion that military power alone will prevent encroachment on their red lines and secure their political goals. The United States also mistakenly believes that defeating an invasion of Taiwan guarantees a foreign policy triumph. Before marching toward catastrophe, Taipei and Beijing should attempt strategic negotiations.