During the first virtual summit between U.S. President Joe Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping in November 2021, the two leaders discussed nuclear issues and, according to U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, agreed to “look to begin to carry forward discussion on strategic stability.”1 This outcome was hardly surprising; as both American and Chinese experts had pointed out, reducing the risk of nuclear weapons use was the countries’ most obvious common interest. Yet, previous U.S. efforts to kick-start a nuclear or strategic stability dialogue with China have been unsuccessful.
Nearly three years after the summit, the countries appear to have made little progress in official dialogues, and unofficial discussions are also less frequent and substantive than before. The message from Chinese officials has become increasingly clear: the United States and China should first stabilize their political relationship before taking on nuclear issues.
For decades, China has sought to build and maintain a credible nuclear second-strike capability (that is, to be able to launch a devastating nuclear retaliation after absorbing a disarming first strike). It has done so to secure a relationship of mutual vulnerability with the United States. Many Chinese nuclear experts have largely accepted the Western term of “strategic stability” to describe such a relationship. They believe that mutual vulnerability reduces both the risk of a nuclear arms race (arms race stability) and nuclear use in a military crisis (crisis stability).
But Chinese political leaders have never accepted the Western definition of strategic stability. Rather, they use the term to refer to the overall stability of a bilateral relationship. To Chinese political leaders, a stable U.S.-China relationship means, first and foremost, a U.S. willingness to accept the legitimacy of China’s political system, coexist peacefully with China, and respect China’s so-called core interests.
Because of this confusion, this report eschews the use of the term strategic stability. Instead, it uses the term “political stability” to describe the broad meaning of strategic stability as understood by Chinese political leaders. From their viewpoint, the core issues plaguing the overall bilateral relationship are political—an aspect that this report will delve into. The report uses the term “nuclear stability” to describe the narrow and classical meaning of strategic stability that is often used in Western literature.2 Nuclear stability includes both arms race stability and crisis stability.
After China tested its first nuclear device in 1964, Mao Zedong and other first generation leaders emphasized the role Chinese nuclear weapons could play in deterring nuclear attacks.3 In the following decades, China maintained a modest nuclear strategy that prioritized achieving nuclear stability with the Soviet Union and the United States. However, its recent nuclear expansion, increasing interest in new nuclear postures such as launch-under-attack, and its declared ambition to build a “powerful strategic deterrent capability system” 4 raise urgent questions about whether China still commits to the traditionally limited goal of maintaining nuclear stability with the United States.
As U.S.-China relations deteriorate and China embarks on a large-scale buildup of its nuclear forces, the security risks are rising. Partly contingent on what countermeasures the United States takes, an escalation of U.S.-China nuclear competition could have far-reaching implications for international security. Addressing this growing danger will require a thorough understanding of Chinese motivations and the thinking behind the country’s changing policy.
Today, international experts are divided over whether China’s nuclear expansion is a response to perceived new military threats, such as U.S. missile defense systems and conventional precision weapons, or whether it is driven by a revisionist security agenda.5 The latter perspective includes the belief that China is systematically shifting away from its traditional nuclear strategy toward a much more aggressive approach, including greater reliance on the first use of nuclear weapons. This might compel the United States to substantially augment its nuclear capabilities.
This report contends that neither perspective fully captures the intricate internal dynamics driving China’s nuclear expansion, positing that the current shifts in the country’s nuclear policy are mainly rooted in changing political considerations. Contemporary Chinese leaders, particularly Xi, have elevated the political importance of nuclear weapons. Coupled with significant changes in China’s domestic political system in recent years, this has led to a nuclear policy that is less cohesive, less coherent, and less aligned with China’s specific security requirements than before. These complex political dynamics remain largely ignored by international policymakers and analysts.
The conventional view among the international policy community that emphasizes protecting the U.S.-China nuclear relationship from the adverse effects of deteriorating bilateral political relations is not without merit.6 However, it is becoming increasingly challenging to maintain nuclear stability separately and independently from the escalating geopolitical rivalry.
Considering the potentially catastrophic consequences of a significant U.S.-China military conflict—which could involve nuclear escalation—the most impactful approach for reducing nuclear risks requires serious efforts from the United States, China, and other countries and civil society actors in the global community to truly comprehend and address the root political issues between the two major powers.
In this context, this report provides a comprehensive examination of China’s prevailing nuclear perspectives and policymaking mechanisms, shedding light on the underlying political challenges and potential strategies for managing them. To strive for an objective examination, the report presents and evaluates Chinese perspectives and, to the extent possible, refrains from injecting the author’s personal judgments about them. The report’s descriptions of Chinese (and American) perspectives should not be interpreted as an endorsement.
The report begins with an introduction of the growing role of political considerations and the declining importance of technical factors in China’s nuclear policymaking. Chapter 1 traces the chronology of China’s recent decisions to expand its nuclear capabilities, detailing how Xi’s anticipation of escalating tensions between Washington and Beijing prompted an initial decision to augment Chinese nuclear forces. The subsequent decline in bilateral relations further solidified the Chinese leader’s perception of an existential threat, resulting in a further acceleration of the nuclear buildup. The chapter underscores how both insecurity and ambition drive Xi’s belief that China needs a greater nuclear capability to influence U.S. perception of the international balance of power and to shape the United States’ overall approach toward China.
Chapter 2 delves into domestic decisionmaking processes in China, scrutinizing domestic actors’ varied influences on the country’s nuclear expansion strategy. As Xi has consolidated power, China’s traditional nuclear policy experts have become increasingly sidelined in a policymaking system that is more closed-off and secretive. Concurrently, Xi has overturned previous leaders’ constraints on the military’s nuclear modernization, giving the military an important mandate to fast-track nuclear development. This shift has had profound effects on the coherence of China’s nuclear policy: the high-level political endorsement shields China’s military—the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)—from external oversight while it makes operational-level decisions. The PLA’s growing interest in acquiring escalation management capabilities, partly driven by the heightened security situation in the Taiwan Strait, carries significant implications for U.S.-China nuclear stability.
Chapter 3 explores the intricate relationship between nuclear stability and political stability in the U.S.-China context, highlighting the challenges posed by the two nations’ divergent goals. It conducts a critical analysis of the underlying logic of China’s attempt to enhance political stability by building up its nuclear capabilities. It also examines the political roots of China’s increasingly acute perception of the United States as an existential threat, emphasizing the significant impact of information and perception gaps between U.S. and Chinese societies. In doing so, the report highlights the obstacles Beijing encounters in its effort to foster political stability through a top-down approach and illustrates why separating bilateral nuclear and political issues would be far more challenging than generally anticipated. It then explores how the growing entanglement between bilateral nuclear and political relations influences both arms race stability and crisis stability between the United States and China.
In the last chapter, the report offers recommendations to mitigate both technical and underlying political challenges in U.S.-China nuclear relations. Though these challenges are extraordinarily severe and solutions elusive, the colossal stakes demand exhaustive efforts. The recommendations are summarized below.
- Mitigate information and perception gaps: Washington and Beijing should address their bilateral rivalry that stokes nuclear competition, starting by acknowledging the presence of information and perception gaps.
- Explore agreements on principles of behavior: Washington and Beijing should draw on positive lessons from the Cold War and build confidence through top-down discussions on principles of behavior.
- Be mindful of amplifying China’s insecurities: As Washington considers countermeasures to China’s nuclear buildup, it should be aware of how certain measures could unintentionally lead to counterproductive outcomes that weaken U.S. deterrence.
Specifically, Washington should:- Understand the impact of China’s insecurity and other internal factors
- Distinguish tangible and likely threats from remote and low-probability threats
- Minimize ambiguity and inconsistency in U.S. nuclear policy
- Improve internal accountability in China: Beijing should facilitate informed and objective assessments of its security interests and external environment and steer balanced decisions regarding nuclear policy goals, priorities, and strategies.
Specifically, Beijing should:- Clarify Chinese concerns and recognize its rivals’ legitimate concerns
- Conduct internal analysis about how China wants to be reassured
- Strengthen its internal nuclear policy review process
- Promote a strategic security dialogue: Washington and Beijing should structure a dialogue to encourage necessary internal policy reflections, resolve practical issues that hinder desired outcomes, and lessen the impact of third-party influences on bilateral nuclear stability.
- Address the conventional-nuclear linkage: Beijing should offer assurances to quell regional fears of conventional military aggression, thus easing resistance to a stabler U.S.-China nuclear relationship.
- Empower the experts: Washington and Beijing should nurture environments for candid, balanced expert counsel; they should also sponsor joint bilateral expert studies to dispel misreadings and chart forward paths.