Indonesia and China held high-level meetings in March and April to discuss bilateral defence ties. Their cooperation, however, is likely to remain hamstrung by underdeveloped military education and training exchanges, infrequent combined exercises and non-existent defence-industrial collaboration.
China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited Jakarta in mid-April to meet with Indonesian President Joko Widodo and his foreign minister, Retno Marsudi. Wang Yi also had a closed-door meeting with the current defence minister and president-elect, General (Retd) Prabowo Subianto, on 18 April. Prabowo noted that they discussed bilateral defence ties, primarily around education and training cooperation, joint exercises and defence-industrial collaboration. The defence minister also discussed these issues with his counterpart, Admiral Dong Jun, during his first overseas visit as president-elect in late March. He also met with Chinese President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Qiang on this trip.
Defence cooperation between Indonesia and China, however, has remained underdeveloped for almost two decades following the launch of their strategic partnership in 2005. Beijing’s encroachment in the South China Sea, Jakarta’s dependence on Western countries for military education, training, exercise and hardware, and a host of domestic political challenges and historical legacies in Indonesia continue to hinder efforts in that area. While there has been tremendous growth in the economic, political, diplomatic and people-to-people ties between the two countries, defence ties remain the weak link in the bilateral relationship.
Minimal military ties
Indonesian and Chinese defence policymakers have tried to elevate bilateral defence ties over the past two decades. Their efforts include developing regular dialogue platforms (including at the ministerial and senior-official levels), exploring defence-industrial collaboration, and instituting combined-military exercises and officer educational exchanges. When measured in terms of high-level visits and meetings, exercises and port calls, a 2017 assessment by the United States’ National Defense University puts Indonesia among China’s top ten military diplomatic partners from 2003–16. Beyond some of these scripted symbolisms, however, military-to-military ties remain significantly underdeveloped.
From 1967–2013, only slightly more than 100 Indonesian military personnel were trained in China. By comparison, Malaysia reportedly sent about the same number of military students to various Chinese military schools between 2015 and 2020 alone. While the Indonesian military had sent more than three dozen of its personnel to various Chinese military schools and programmes in 2009, over the past decade it has often struggled to send a third of that number annually. This is despite China reportedly offering seats at almost two dozen courses and programmes. By contrast, more than 7,300 Indonesian students have trained in some 200 US military-education and training programmes over the last two decades.
Some of the challenges in such exchanges relate to language barriers. Indonesian students were barred from studying the Chinese languages for much of the anti-communist New Order era (1966–98) under president Suharto, who ‘froze’ diplomatic ties with China from 1967–90. Military officers, meanwhile, did not have a Chinese language training lab at the defence ministry until less than a decade ago. Indonesian officers have also privately complained about the quality and utility of courses taken at various Chinese military schools and programmes. While a few Indonesian alumni claimed strong attachments to China, others reported not being able to feel the full immersive and learning experience as they often took different classes and lived separately from their Chinese counterparts.
Moreover, given the Indonesian Army’s strong anti-communist history and track record, there are often informal barriers to career promotions for those trained in China. Beijing’s aggressive behaviour in the South China Sea and beyond has exacerbated political sensitivities in Indonesia relating to its growing economic footprint in the country. Indonesian military leaders suspended their bilateral special forces exercises (Sharp Knife) in 2015, reportedly due to China’s maritime behaviour. This is significant given that from 2003–22, Indonesia held only four combined-military exercises with China. By contrast, Indonesia held more than 100 with the US in the same period.
Hardly any hardware
China has never been a defence-industrial partner to Indonesia, nor a significant provider of its arms and equipment. Despite Beijing’s promises almost two decades ago to help build Indonesia’s defence industry – including a 2011 memorandum of understanding on joint missile production – the collaboration never materialised. Indonesia still acquired minor equipment from China, including C-705 and C-802 (CH-SS-N-6) anti-ship missiles and QW-3 man-portable surface-to-air missiles, Giant Bow anti-aircraft guns, as well as other small gear, such as helmets and vests.
These acquisitions, however, never led to major arms purchases or defence-industrial partnerships. Some Indonesian defence policymakers privately thought the Chinese baulked at the potential price tag of a joint missile project, while others were concerned about the quality of the hardware acquired from China. In 2017, for example, the Giant Bow malfunctioned and fired off shots randomly during military exercises in Natuna, killing four Indonesian soldiers and injuring eight others.
A year before, the failure to launch a C-705 missile during a naval exercise was cited as one of the reasons why the plan to produce-under-license Chinese missiles in Indonesia stalled. These concerns perhaps explain why Indonesia’s only recent major procurement from China has been six CH-4B armed intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAV), ordered in 2019. International Institute for Strategic Studies research estimates that this programme represents a miniscule proportion – approximately 0.09% – of around US$30 billion worth of defence-import deals signed by Indonesia since 2014. The majority have been with American and European companies.
Compartmentalisation ahead
It is difficult, however, to significantly boost Indonesia–China defence ties. Aside from the bare-bones military-to-military foundation, Indonesia’s defence establishment has also not fully shed its anti-communist outlook and legacies. China’s actions in the South China Sea and the concerns associated with its growing economic influence in Indonesia add more barriers. There is, as yet, no strong strategic, economic, technological or operational consideration that would compel defence policymakers in Jakarta to turn to China for arms and equipment, education, training or exercises.
Jakarta’s defence ties with US and European partners are likely to grow during a Prabowo presidency. As defence minister for the past five years, he has developed a new long-term modernisation plan for the next two decades relying mostly on Western arms and equipment. The wars in Ukraine and the Middle East and the geopolitical uncertainty surrounding US–China strategic competition have helped provide some public rationale and urgency to modernise the military. As president, he is likely to expand this plan.
On the other hand, the political coalition responsible for bringing Prabowo to power includes major business groups with strong interests in expanding Indonesia’s economic ties with China. As great-power competition polarises the region, Jakarta is likely to insist on strategic compartmentalisation – stronger defence ties with the West and growing economic entanglement with China at the same time. In this sense, Prabowo represents an extension, if not an expansion, of his predecessor’s policies. The recent discussions on Indonesia–China defence ties in Beijing and Jakarta therefore reflect performative talking points rather than a significant policy shift. Without a well-institutionalised defence partnership, Indonesia’s long-term relationship with China will lack strategic heft and ballast.