CHINA’S PLAN OF PATIENCE TO DOMINATE THE SOUTH PACIFIC

China intends to draw the 10 Pacific nations into its orb of influence to project its power over the South Pacific. Undeterred by the rejection of its trade and security deal by these countries in May end, the Chinese government has revealed a medium-term, multi-pronged initiative to pummel the countries with ‘goodies’ to soften them enough to get what it wants.

Foreign Minister Wang Yi was on a tour of the 10 Pacific countries, familiarising them with his government’s format of a deal that was short-circuited by concerns that it could “threaten regional stability”.

Wang was not agitated the deal fell through. Perhaps he never expected the countries to take the bite at the very first meeting. Like with all things, China has a long-rope, long-time policy to achieve its goals with perseverance, patience and relentless pursuit of the target countries.

An unfazed Wang immediately took a tactical step backward and excluded “security” from the issues he originally wanted to include into the deal. He must have thought that would blunt criticism from the West as well.

He then told reporters: “China will release its own position paper on our own positions and propositions and cooperation proposals with Pacific Island countries, and going forward we will continue to have ongoing and in-depth discussions and consultations to shape more consensus on cooperation.” 

He did not have to go back to the Politburo to thrash out a position paper because the paper was already there, quietly released by the government for internal reflection on May 30, that is, even Wang met the 10 foreign ministers.

The accessed paper is titled, “China’s Position Paper on Mutual Respect and Common Development with Pacific Island Countries”. The 24-point, detailed, paper is a typical gambit of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) where it makes generalised statements and tactical assertions unilaterally, assuming that the targeted countries will have no objection to them.

The position paper lays the foundation by citing every minor instance where Beijing helped any of the 10 countries right from the 1970s. The list of services Beijing extended to them during the Covid pandemic are highlighted. The paper uses these incidents of cooperation as the premise to assert that “since the establishment of diplomatic ties in the 1970s, relations between China and Pacific Island Countries have flourished,  and exchanges and cooperation have been expanding in more than 20 areas, including trade, investment, ocean affairs, environmental protection, disaster preparedness and mitigation, poverty alleviation and health. China has implemented nearly 500 complete plant projects, technical assistance, in-kind assistance and concessional loan projects in Pacific Island Countries, helped them build important infrastructure such as road, bridge, wharf, hospital, school and stadium, and trained about 10,000 professionals in various fields”.

For good measure, it produces statistical data between 1992 and 2021 to say that the “total trade volume between China and Pacific Island Countries having diplomatic relations with China registered an average annual increase of 13% and expanded by over 30 times”. It even as the accurate figures of Chinese tourists visiting the South Pacific countries before and after the pandemic.

Then comes the crux of the paper: “China is committed to deepen its comprehensive strategic partnership featuring mutual respect and common development with Pacific Island Countries, so as to build a closer China-Pacific Island Countries community with a shared future.” Though couched in general terms, the political intent of the CCP cannot be missed. China is looking to lead a South Pacific grouping, come what may.

The position paper explains how China will go about achieving the goal. The opening points appear innocent, informing the Pacific countries that China upholds “that all countries, regardless of their size, strength and wealth, are equals”, that it is an advocate “for peace, development, equity, justice, democracy and freedom”, and that it respects “the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Pacific Island Countries, support Pacific Island Countries in independently choosing development paths suited to their national conditions, adhere to non-interference in internal affairs of Pacific Island Countries”.

These are followed by the real objectives. The crucial one is this: “Appreciate that Pacific Island Countries firmly abide by the one-China principle, and understand and support China’s core interests and major concerns.” It is only to be assumed what China’s reaction would be if any country deviates from this stand.

The “security” issue pops up once again because that is the raison d’etre for the entire South Pacific exercise. “Follow the vision of common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security, so as to promote regional peace and security. Uphold the international non-proliferation regime with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as its cornerstone and support the development of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone. Combat transnational crime including cyber crime, and jointly tackle non-traditional security threats.”

The controversial Belt and Road Initiative is mentioned in the position paper as the route to the economic prosperity of the “region”. The Initiative is sought to be linked “with regional cooperation initiatives such as ‘Pacific Aid for Trade Strategy 2020-2025’, ‘Regional E-commerce Strategy’ and ‘Pacific Quality Infrastructure Initiative’, (to) deepen mutually beneficial cooperation in fields of infrastructure, agriculture, forestry and fishery, energy, mining, information and communication technology, e-commerce and tourism”. The implications are obvious.

The paper talks about expanding “market access to China for Pacific Island Countries’ featured products such as agro-products”, but omits mentioning how many Chinese products will find a market in these countries. It refers to “marine environment” and supporting the “Pacific Island Countries in protecting the marine environment, and carry out cooperation on ocean forecasting and disaster early-warning”. That is one way of legitimising the presence of Chinese maritime machinery in the South Pacific under the pretext of helping save the environment.

The paper mentions scores of ways in which China and things Chinese will creep into these countries through scholarships, exchange programs, visits by Chinese teams to offer help where necessary, and so forth.

These exercises will be backed by institutionalised arrangements like holding regular meetings of China-Pacific Island foreign ministers, China-Pacific Island Countries Economic Development and Cooperation Forum, and China-Pacific Island Countries Agriculture Ministers’ Meeting. China proposes to even “appoint a Chinese government special envoy for Pacific Island Countries affairs”.

At the diplomatic level, the paper envisages Beijing holding “training programs for young diplomats from Pacific Island Countries” and woo them with “2,500 government scholarships”, and “3,000 human resource training opportunities”.

The first trance of money proposed to be doled out is in the form of injecting “an additional $2 million to the China-Pacific Island Countries Anti-COVID-19 Cooperation Fund in 2022”.

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